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This study bas been undertaken to study wl,tat role II 
I• 
charismatic characteristics in a man play in Public lelation~l 
It is my contention that when such supernatural gifts are II 
II found in a person, then this person need not follow--indeed II 
I as in the case of de Gaulle does not follow--the traditional I~ 
.I 
channels of P.R. to achieve his ends. His charisma takes 
the place of a planned Public Relations program in moldin& 
I Public Opinion. It acts as a channel of communications 
between the leader and the masses. 
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It is an accepted fact that political leaders--more II 
' ~ 
so than other types (reliaious, eclucational, cultural)-·come 11 
I~ 
ii 
to be what they are with the ticle of bistctrical circumatancesl~ · 
I In times of crisis these leadeu:·a are selected from others•• 
I I maybe with similar peraonalities••but with certain specific 
I 
· &ifts of the body and spirit••aift• that havd been believed 
to be supernatural, and not accessible to everybody. 
This document will attempt to describe these 
characteristics in de Gaulle, and show how he used the. to 
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achieve his eads. lbree u-· 1a history be bas unittKl tbe ~ 
II I 
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1 whole nation--when this was in a complete cbaos•-bebind bim 
and led it to safe ground. 
Three times it was done, defyin& the traditional il ~ ,j 
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!i P .a. planning • • • ''Throwing a clear li&ht oo the leader's I! 
'I 
activities in order to be of value to ":"bl' leilder hitnself.u 
The investigation showed that at least this was 
li I! 
II 
lj 
h 
I' ,I 
il li the case with de Gaulle. If this could be proved for other ·' 
jl 
,, leaders, then some interesting inferences could be drawn 
I! about leadership and Public Relations. At the present 
I moment, the field of study in P.R. has neglected this 
I conception. 
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IBTIODUCTIOlf 
Max Weber in his essay on the Sociology of 
Cbarismt~&e Aytho&ity writes: 
• • • natural leaders--in time of psychic, physical, 
religious, political distress--have been oeither office 
holders nor incumbents of aa "occupation" in the present 
sense of the word, that is, men who_have acquired expert 
knowledae and wbo serve for remuneration. The natural 
leaders in diatxess have been holders of specific gifts 
of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been 
believed to be supernatural, not accessible to eve~ybody. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tbis bolds for doctors and prophets, just as for judges 
and military leaders, or for leaders of big bunting 
expeditions. 
De Gaulle fulfills Weber's requirements. Three times 
in the last twenty years--at times of crisis--he was able to 
sell his imaae of a leader to the Preach people and guide 
them out of trouble. Steadfast on what be believed was 
right, he used his charisma to implement his political 
philosophy, a philosophy so obscure that at times even his 
closest friends seem to be at a loss over it. 
Yet it is not so rauch bi.a political philosophy that 
Prance••and the allies during the war--were interested in, 
~hen they looked upon him for help. On the contrary; several 
n~==~================================4===== 
times they were resentful of it; but it was in his leadership 
and courage, his faith in his beliefs, and his ability to 
implement them. This interest is what de Gaulle exploits. 
finally after a life-time of stru&~le, he is able to see his 
dream come true, a strong presidential regime for france. 
Charismatic leader•••uolike ordinary professional 
bureaucrats--use rather unorthodox ways in implementing his 
authority. This is understandable when seen from the 
foundations and instability of charismatic authority. By 
his nature the charismatic leader feels his "legitimacy*' 
(other than that flowing from personal strength) as something 
which constantly must be proven • • • hence the unorthodox 
ways. 
As Weber aaain puts it: 
The charismatic leader &&ina and maintains authority 
solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to 
be a prophet, be must perform miracles; if he wants to be 
a war lord, be must perform heroic deeds. Above all, 
however, his divine mission must prove itself in that 
those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. 
If they do not fare well, be is obviously not the master 
sent by the gods. 
From his first article published in 1925 expounding 
~s rebellious conceptions about obsolescence of 'Wethod a 
Priori" warfare to the 1960 referendum on Algeria, de Gaulle 
~ proved that he was obviously the master sent by the gods. 
2 
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Ia proved this however in the unorthodox ways by which he is 
known, such as the time when lrace had capitulated, and 
de Galle alone in England, with bardly any power of 
authority and strength, threatened the British to break off 
J, all diplomatic relations between lrea France and IDgland 
I 
I. unless the latter did what de Gaulle was asking. 
!I 
j Incidents like the above are everyday matters in de 
i Gaulle's political life. And yet he survived all criticism 
j simply because the public relations methods he was using 
II were effective. (1) Because he atrooaly believed in wbat he 
:! wanted, (2) be went directly to tbe source to get it, (3) he I 
I had confidence in his fellow man. They were not public 
I 
II relations methods in the sense that "an enlightened climate 
I of opinion" explain a P .a. , but in the aeoae of one us in& a 
personal trait to sell a product. De Gaulle was using his 
charisma as a leader to sell his political philosophy to 
France, and Prance as a power to the world. 
projects all through his life. These are: 
1. His sense of self-confidence 
2. His sense of sacred mission 
3. His imaae as a savior of Prance 
4. His sense of leadership 
5. tis acceptance to assure. the full burden of 
leadership 
6. lis sense of solitude 
7 • lis :l.JUie as a crusader 
8. tis ~aaae as a leacter 
9. ~· ability to make decieione 
10. lis sense of inner determination 
4 
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CHAPTER I 
THE YIAIS or PUP ARATIOII 
The l!bel Jear1 
Charles Aadre Joseph Marie de Gaulle, on January 8, 
1959, was sworn in as the first president of the Fifth 
l.epublic. 
Botn in Lille in 1890, third child of Henry de Gaulle 
"a thouahtful, cultivated, tnditional man, inhered with a 
feeling for the iignity of rz:ance."1 His father bad. 
participated in the 1870-71 War as a lieutenant and was 
wounded during the siege of Paris. up to 1898 he was 
attached to the Home Ministry but lost his job when in that 
year the right wing majority loat its position in the midst 
of the Dreyfus case. Henry de Gaulle then became a teacher 
at a Jesuit school. The left wing republican taking over, 
started their anti-clerical policy, that in 1905 closed down 
religious congregations, includina the one of his father'·•· 
By now Charles was fifteen, preparing for St. Cyr. 
1Cbarlea de Gaulle, CAll to Jlqno:r (llew York: The "~==~V~i~ki~n&~P~:re~a~s~··~l~9~5~51~,~P~·~J~.============================t~~= 
I 
,, 
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II 
jaer 
De Gaulle's mother was a remote cousin of his father. 
family had Celtic blood from the McCartan of Ireland and 
Scotch blood froa the fleming who came to france with Jack II 
lAs de Gaulle describes her, "she bad an uncompromising 
·lpaaaion for her country, equal only t:o her religious piety. ul 
I Be remembers his "mother conjuriag up the despair 
whe felt as a girl at the ai&ht of her parents in tears: 
11azaine has capitulated."2 Be must have felt her influence 
all his life, for he mentions her twice more in his 
memoirs, once as he flew over to London and passed the 
village where his mother lay very ill and the second time 
iwhen letters and messages were sent to him as his mother 
1i died at Paiapont on J'uly 16 "offerin& up her suffering to 
I! 
ilaod for the salvation of the country and her son's mission. n3 
The familial background of his early life therefore 
2 Ibid., p. 6. 
3 n DU·, P· 101. 
~==~r==============··--============-~-~-~=--====-~=·== 
6 
"' I of the changes taking place, remembrance of past glories, 
isolation from the trend of the day, a certain aristocratic 
despisal for the coming up of the new classes, a strong 
Jclutch to the tradition of their milieu. 
Philippe Barres, gives us a most vivid description 
10f de Gaulle's early youth. 
I 
r 
1Philippe Barrea, CQ!Elea de Qaulle (lew York: 
oubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1941). 
2De Gaulle, Ctll to loner, p. 4. (', ~==~============================= 
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COIDIIlarJd. ul It is this Petain who mentions de Gaulle in his 
dispatchea. 2 World War I was an eye•opener for de Gaulle. 
• • • as the hurricane swept me off like a wisp of straw 
through the shocks of war--my baptism of fire, the 
cavalry of the trenches, attacka, bombardments, wounds 
and captivity••I was privileaed to see Prance, though 
cleprived of part of her necessary means of defence by an 
insufficient birth rate, by hollow ideologies, and by the 
negligence of the authorities, .extract from herself an 
incredible effort, make up ~Y meaaureless sacrifices for 
all she lacked, and bring tke trial to an end in victory. 
I was privileged to see her, in the moat critical days, 
pull herself together morally, at first under the aegis 
of Joffre, at the eud of the drive of the "Tiaer. u 1 was 
privileged to see her, later, though exhausted from 
losses and devastation, with her social structure and 
moral balance overthrown, resume with totterio& steps her 
march towards her destiny, wbile the regime, taking once 
more its former shape and r-.udiatin& Clemenc!au, 
rejected greatness and returned to confusion • 
.. re de Gaulle starts eupbemizin& his love for France, a 
euphemism wbioh would one day lead de Gaulle to see himself 
~d france as one and the same. 
In 1920 de Gaulle marries Yvonne Vendroux, A 
jtelegram of congratulations from Petai.n shows the interest 
1 lk!.!l·, p. 5. 
1~916. 2official text of de Gaulle's Citation a l'Ordre, 
a 
lne Gaulle, Qjll to Bqnqr, p. S. 
n~==~================================~==== 
, . ., 
etf the latter in the youoa officer. De Gaulle sees in 
Petain a hero, and names bis first child Phillippe after 
,etain. 
1921 find• him fi&htin& with General Weygand in 
Poland against lolabevik Russia. 1924·26 he spent at the 
filar College in Paris, where his first rebel instincts are 
~osecl. 
In accorclaQce with the custGIIls of the War Colle&e, 
at the end of the year of instructions, pupils and 
teachers went on a tactical trip. This trip consisted of 
a aeries of field maaoeuvers durin& which the pupils 
cODIID.&Ocled important units in orcler to put their lessons 
to a practical test. That year, 4e Gaulle was in command 
of the '~lue Armyt' so called because the soldiers wear a 
clistinpishin& urk ( a strip of blue cloth) on their 
helmets. The manoeuvers t•lt place near Grenoble, on the 
frontier of the Alps. De Gaulle after reconnoitering the 
situation and the terrain, decided not to apply the 
famous .. a priori method. •• • refused to prepare his 
section of terrain and stack to the idea of freedoa of 
movement and initiative. 
It created a great to 4o among the high officers who 
were judges of the manee.uvers. Jut the pupils were 
allowed complete freedom of choice and de Gaulle was 
permitted to do as he saw fit, however revolutionary his 
methods mi&ht seem. Anyway, the manoeuver ended in a 
brilliant victory for the ''Jlues", cOIIIIIlanded by de Gaulle. 
The discomfitted defender of the section-of-terrain theory 
Ceneral Moyrand, sent for tile conqueror and tried to 
convince him that, while be had obviously won, his success 
was revolutionary only in appearance. In reality he bad 
taken his inspiration from the official doctrine and so 
be should not try to make c.,i tal of his aethoa. But 
de Gaulle held his success and had no intention of letting 
himself be aoft•soaped. Be bad won without following the 
official metbAJds and he stuck to his point. Then Moyrand 
9 
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got mad. Inateacl of aeadina him to the geueral sfaff of 
. the army in Paris, be waa sent to the Rhine Army. 
I1Tbb 1a the firat incideot tlult ahowa de Gaulle' a thf.rat for 
!leadership. His inner voice wa1 true only to his ideals of 
I 
I leadership in play, rather than playing the leader; a voice 
,, 
jtbat would guide him aeme day to chance the whole political 
:! structure of france. The incicleat ereatecl something of a 
! 
scandal and finally reached. the ears of the cOIIIDWld.er-in-
cbief••Marsbal Philippe Petain. le sent for de Gaulle; 
limpres1ed by his explanation and the result of the manoeuver& 
Petain appointed him a year later, October, 1925, as his 
assistant to help him publish a book on the history of the 
jl'rencb Army. 
I In the same year be is attached to the Secretariat 
I lof the Supreme Council of 8atioaal Defense, where he ia to 
I 
l 1come in contact with politics for the first time. 
At this period I was detailed to tbe Secretariat 
General de la Defense Rationale, a permanent body at 
the disposal of the Premier for preparing th~ state and 
the nation for war. From 1932 to 1937, undar 14 
sovernments, I found myself involved, in a planning 
capacity, in the whole ranae of political, technical and 
administrative activity eoneernina the country's defense. 
I had, in particular, to be familiar with the plans 
for security and for transportation of armaments 
1Ph1lippe Iarrea, Chtl:le• de ifulle,' p. 22. 
10 
presented by Aadre Tardieu and Paul loucour, respectively, 
at Geneva; to supply the Doumergue Cabinet with the 
elements for ita decisioas wbea it chose to adopt a 
different course after the arrival of the fuhrer; to 
weave the Penelope-web of the bill for the wartime 
organization of the nation; and to go into the civil 
clepartmeats, of industry, aocl of public services. The 
work I had to do, the cli&Cllaaion at which I was present, 
the contracts I was obli&ed to make, showed me the 
extent1of our resources, but also the feebleness of the state. 
lis realization of the feebleness of state because 
of politics disturbs him stillimore. 2 
This appointmeot atvea de O.Ulle a chance to expaacl 
his embrionic rebellious conceptions about the obsolescence 
of ''Method a Priori., warfare. Jut few paid any attention to 
wh~~ he had to aay.l 
lven Petain "althoup illpresaeci by de Gaulle • a 
obvious develop-.nt of a better method, bad done nothing to 
make it a substitute. u4 
The close cooperation with retain is to continue up 
to 1927, when the Marshall cedes bit position to Weygand and 
1
ne Gaulle, Call to IPR!E, p. 6. 
2 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
lstanley Clark, The Man Who Is Prance (Mew York: Dodd
1 Head and Company, 1960), pp. 60, 67. 
4 lJ!&!.. p. 67. 
11 
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I 
de Gaulle is &iven command of the 19th Battalion of 
Chasseurs at Trier in the lbineland••atill occupied by the 
French. 
Prom this neiJbborboecl de Gaulle could see clearly 
what was to become of Europe. Stanley Clark gives a picture. 
He wrote at that time to Lucien Kachin, now a 
publisher, that the days of the ArrAy of the Rhine were 
owabered. "I • convioeed that the Anschluss is 
approaching, and that Germany is crowing in streoath and 
determination, that abe will make claim8 on the territory 
of Poland aad will reclaim froaa France the province of 
Alsace•Lorrain." Be waa certain also that the resurgence 
of Germany presented the world with a danger of world 
war. lis letters many tiaes ..nt1oned the1inevitability of world war once Gerraany bqan to expand. 
Ills eaaemaas to study the problem of france takes 
him to the IU.clclle last, aad on his return in 1932 he 
published Lt Jj.,l de l 'II•! on tile philosophy of cOIJilland, and 
dedicates it to Petain. Be hopes the Marshal will support 
him in his ideas of .. the philosophy of action, !aspiration 
and use ef armies by the State, the relations between 
government and high coaaand ••• u2 Ideas that have pre-
occupied him for a long time.l 
1
.1Ja19., P• 69. 
2Charles de Gaulle, Ice fil de l 'Ieee 
3stanley Clark, Abe 1!9 Who Is fEancs, p. 71. 
12 
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-rrom this point of view we can now see why it was 
easy ~n 1940 for de Gaulle to commit an act of mutiny aaainst 
his nation's "vested" power, invokin& a higher patriotism, 
ao act his conscience dictated. 
Like an oracle he also looks into the future. 
The advance of the machine aae, the mechanization of 
almost every industrial process, convinced him that war 
must be similarly mechanized.. lroductiGD•line methods inl 
the factory, the nonstop movin& forward of the article 
bein& manufactured., were pointers to what military men 
would call for and develop in future wars, be was now 
convinced. Here waa tbe aena of the idea for the 
mechanized division and army which, once em the move, 
would never atop until fh• end of the particular 
enaaaemeat was reached. . 
As usual, history will prove he is right. 
In 1934 he is promote4 to the rank of Lieutenant 
.Colonel. Tbe comin& of Bitler a~aed in de Gaulle once more 
I 
,the seuae of prophecy, the call to duty. The same year he 
published his second work Vet! 6'6r!fe dt H!tier, statio& his 
I 
conception of the need for a small professional and mobile 
larm,.2 Aaain he dedicatee thia to the Marahal.3 
~~ :::~:·p~:~ h to arouse the entqonisa of aaay 
I 2Charlea de Gaulle, Jbe G!ll te Jea9r, p. 9. 
lcharles de Gaulle, Vera l'Armee de Metier, 14. Bersez~ 
("', !Levrault, Paris, 1934. 
13 
,, 
of the Prencb mili;ary leaders, and begin the break with 
Petain. It also caused his removal from the promotion list. 
The rearming of Germany, however, worried de Gaulle 
seriously, and once asain he feels the call of duty calling 
him to action. 
I could not bear to see the enemy of tomorrow 
endowing himself with the means of victory while France 
was still without them. And yet, in the incredible 
apathy in which the nation waa plunged, no voice in 
authority was lifted to ciemaad the required action. The 
stake was so sreat that it did not seem to me permissible 
to maintain my reserve, sli&ht as were my importaace and 
my f8De. lesponaibility for national defence belonged 
to the government. I resolved to carry the debate there. 
This call of duty, however, is just another inner voice of 
~ Jhis cruaadina spirit. By sayina '~sponaibility for national 
!defence belonaed to the aovernmeat," he exposes the feelings 
of an army officer that move to defend the areatneas of 
rrance••whicb the politiciaas were failing to do. But his 
conception for a professional aray supported by a mechanized 
!force and his efforts to induce le&is1ation fell on deaf 
ears. Tbis disturbed bim.2 
ly 1938 Bitler bad moved••Germany crossed the lbine, 
forbidden to 
1
charles de Gaulle, Sfll t! lopor, p. 10. 
2lbid.' p. 18. 
14 
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I 
the Germans. By now de Gaulle was well convinced of his 
role in history. In 1938 as an extra effort to arouse 
interest he published L! Fr~nce et son Ae!!e out of the notes 
he took in 1925 as an assistant to Petain. 1 
In 1939 bia predictions started to materialize. 
I Hitler attacked, precisely the way de Gaulle had visualized. 
A last effort of de Gaulle to arouse his superiors in the 
necessity for action failed.2 
But as he records, in his memoirs, even though his 
memorandum pro4uced no results, they had some effect. On 
was fatal for de Gaulle. Rot only his disgust for politics 
rose, but also the disappointmeat in his life-long hero.4 
1 Ib&d., p. 27. 
2 lb&d •• p. 24. 
3 ~ .. p. 31. 
4stanley Clark, The Man Who Js France, pp. 101-102. 
15 
The disillusionment in his hero is complete at the 
capitulation. His greatest leader having usurped the ranks 
of the great, de Gaulle seeks consolation elsewhere.l 
This led him to London, and the beginning of the 
new era. 
While I was taking rooma and Courcel was telephoning 
to the Embassy and the missions and finding them already 
reticent, I seemed to myself, alone as I was and deprived 
of everything, like a man2on tk• shore of an ocean, proposing to swim across. 
On June 18, 1940, he broadcasted his famous message. 
Rext day he telegraphed to General Roaues C·A-C in North 
Africa and Resident General in MOrocco, placing himself 
(de Gaulle) at his orders if he should reject the armistice. 3 
But this and other efforts to set other commander, in the 
French possessions overseas to refuae the enemy conditions, 
and form a "Defence Cotrmitteeu that would go on with war had 
all failed. Be thus realized the inevitable. 
In face of the frighteuioa void of the General 
renunciation my mission seemed to me all of a sudden 
clear e.ad terrible. At this moment, the worst in her 
history, it was for me to assume the burden of Prance. 4 
lCharles de Gaulle, 9111 to Honor, p. 73. 
2JJ.?!d., p. 80. 
3 1b3.4., p. 8.5. 
4 ~ JJ?id., p. 88. 
16 
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CIW'TER II 
Dl GAULLI 'S NATIOIIALISlt I 
To understand de Gaulle's actions from now on one has 
to keep in mind his past; his disappointment in the 
jPOliticians•·aoverned by self•centered ambitions, hunger for 
!political power, and party philosophy and his disappointment 
in the institutions of J'raoce that failed to give any one 
I person the stick of leadership, especially the President ia 
! 
time of need. In his mQU!Dira he confir:2a it:.l 
Since early youth de Gaulle wanted to do something 
I
! "&r~~&t" for hi• country; he waat:e<l to aerve ber better than 
anybody else. this exclusive devotion could only be 
satisfied in extreme dramatic situations (tragic elements) 
\!either as conqueror of great fame or as 
ilunsb.ak.able courase in times of need. 
savior of 
i 
I I was convinced that France would have to ao through 
gigantic trials, that the interest of life consisted in 
1 Jbicl. J p. 80. ('. ----~=-==i--================== 
I 
one clay reaclerin& her soma aipal service, and that I 
would bave the occasion to do ao.l 
Jut intereatin&ly eaoup tbe country ia often 
ideatified with a feminine fisure: 
The emotional aide of .. tends to imaatne Prance like 
the princess in the fairy tales or the Madonna in the 
frescos, as dedicated toward ao exalted and exceptional 
destiay. Instiactively, I bave the feeling that 
providence baa created ber eijber for complete success 
or for exemplary misfortunes. 
la bia •-ira and in ~s speeches he would thus 
refer to Prance aa a lclay or •re often even as a 110thezo wbo 
has to suffer great pains until she ia saved by the best of 
1
uzo sons. 
I 
I 
II 
II 
Despite insults, torture and treason, despite the 
tears abed fozo bezo defeate4 aray, bezo imprisoned youth 
and her dyina chi ltlren • • • 3 
Throup the mist of blood anti tears with which her 
enemies thoupt to blin4 ber, rrace bas seen that tlae 
only path to salvation is the one cbofen for her by 
those of her sons who are still free. 
Be tbua identified bimaelf with the beat sons of 
France and seczoetly believes bi .. elf to be the best of all. 
ll!!!sl., p. 4. 
2Jbid., p. 3. 
3J:b1 fpescpes of Qegegl de GgJle, p. 89. 
41b&i· • p. 96. 
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Pourioa over the aulf into which the country has 
fallen, I am her son, callina her, showina her the way 
of rescue. Many have joined me already, others will 
come, I am aure. I can bear France now answerin& me. 
In the ciepth of the abyss she is risina up qain, aha is 
on the march, she is climbin& the elope. 1Ah, mother, such aa we are, we are here to serve you. 
The thircl reason wby he <ii.d it was tbe Grandeur of 
his beloved France. for de Gaulle " • • • Prance ia not 
really herself unless in tile front rank. In abort, France 
cannot be France witheut Greatness. u2 And what ia it that 
binders it••crises which were products of political factions, 
~ self•ceotered politicians, and foreian statesmen with wolf-
like appetites. 
Witnesain& the crumblin& of his beloved rraoce while 
Ia politician and military elite refuse to act, de Gaulle 
1cbarlea de Gaulle, 1\t C!ll to loftor, p. 302. He 
must aomehew bave been iaflueacecl by Jules Michelet, who 
writes of france •'IJo cld.lclrea, bow well that you were the 
Sons of France; abe herself tells you so; the sons of that 
great 1110tber, of her who ia uatined, in equality to bring 
fartb nations. " liato;j.cal View tf the French Myg\p.tj.og, 
frODl ita Earliest IndicatiODa to the rliabt of the ICina in 
1791, by C. Cooks, new ed. (Lonaa: s. Bell and Sons, 1890, 
Book III, Chapters X•XII), pp. 312•403. 
2Charles de Gaulle, The Call tg JJooor, p. 3. 
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jl realized the weaknesses of Frace lay in her institutions. 
11 Whenever cris:l.a atruck, the Gr..,deur of Fr8Dce wu at 
1 stake. Internally politicians would ignore her, as long as t 
I. they got what they wanted--usually political power. I 
II ' 
1 Externally others were happy for bar weaknesses, for 'it kept 
I 
J her eut of their way. 
i I tis authority arad leplity established, cie Gaulle 
1l turneci hia tboqhta to tbe philoaopby of state, ..,ci tlla 
I . 
l:l.natitut:l.ooa that would llalp rr.Dce :1.11 her poatwar perinci to 
ll bold the greatness that was becOid.n& her. 
il ftaoge and l!!i Ipstitutiogs 
1
1 In hi• ..... in de Galle r--•r• hie thouibta about 
I 
1 
the problem. The thoupt must have been with him a long 
t 
II 
II 
'I 
while, for be d.etermined. to do aometbiag about it. 
Accordina to the voice of the great majority, the 
tnci;ep gliM waa doomed. lut it is important to re•lize 
that in the minds of many delegates . what bad been faulty 
about the old system. wu not u m.uch an excess u a lack 
of dema&OIY• !be confusion of powers and responsibilitie 
tllat baa deprived it of a strona pvernment, that had 
denied it aoy fim and continuout policy and set it adrif 
at the mercy of events, was not, in the majority's eyes, 
what DUst be refomed. Or ra.r, the reform was 
supposedly to be made by piai still further in the 
direction of making the chief executive nothing more than 
a fiaurebead. 
to attribute to a sin&~e Assembly all powers without 
exception, to give it tbe capacity to invest and provide 
20 
ministers, to abolish the Senate that might constitute a 
useful counterbalance, to auppresa the chief of the state 
or at leaat, reduce him to a still more ridiculous 
condition than the one in which the past system bad 
imprisoned him••such was the conception of a great number 
of the delesates. Tb.ey dreamed aloud of a "single and 
sovereigo" Aasembly like the Convention of the Revolution 
which thou&h it spared itself the auillotine would 
nevertheless find no obstacle to ita energies, ud in 
which moat of the politiciaas who emerged frOID the 
resistance intended to sit soae day. 
I did not share this inclination. On the contrary, 
what seemed to me essential for the nation's future 
recovery was a regime of action and responsibility. As 
I saw it, it was essential that the powers be separated 
so that there WCMald be, reapectively and effectively, a 
government, a parliament add a judiciary. It was 
essential that the chief of 9t~te, by the method of his 
election, by his rank, his ,ewers, be in a position to 
fulfill the function of national arbiter. It was 
essential tbat the people be able to associate themselves 
c11rectly, by means of a referendum, with the crucial 
decisions that would determiae its destiny. I was deeply 
concerned when I realized the state of mind of those who 
would control the state tomorrow and who were striving to 
reconstruct the re&ime for tbe sport of politicians 
rather thaa for the service of the nation. Were we to 
learn no other lesson fr• this confusion, this 
incoaeiateacy which bad brou&ht Prance to disaster and 
the lepublic to abdication. than to go on to further 
confusion, more serious inconsistency still?l 
The separation of power was what would. &iva him the 
"fiat" to lead Prance, back to areatness. Pree from the 
levil pressures of politicians and tbe Aaaembly, the chief•of-
state would be in an excellent position to fulfill the 
1Charles de Gaulle, JJsi ty (Hew Yorks Siaon and 
1Schuater, 1959). p. 176. 
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functioa of a "national arbite~;" This reflects de Gaulle's 
charismatic characteristic, that as a leader he sheuld•-in 
the final ualysis of tb.in&a••assuae the burden hiuelf. And 
only the people would have the risht through the referendum 
to question these decisions. 
'Pruce and ller Allies 
But if french Graacieur was victimized by Frenchmen, 
it was also victtmized much mare so by others. 
De Gaulle was well aware of the historical strugles 
between European powers for world supremacy. It was 
f" precisely this he had in mind wheo oa Aupat 7, 1940, be 
s1gned the agreement with British recoanizing france's 
sovereignty••hencefortb Free Prance's•-over the French 
lmpire.l Por de Gaulle whatever happened from now on, Prance 
should emerge from the war, not only victorious, but with a 
,lace amongst the major powers. 
Bence de Gaulle's conceptioa of Free France's role in 
the war, "Hot aid. &i ven by a lumclful of Frenchmen 
,_erely some Frenchmen, but France. n2 
• • 
1Charles de Gaulle, Jb! C.ll to l!nor, p. 96. 
2 
• not 
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Although I was convinced that &iven the proportion 
between the resources, the joint military operations, on 
land, on sea, and in the air, should normally be directed 
by British commanders, I reserved for myself in all cases 
the "supreme c001118Dcl" of the French forces and accepted 
for them only ,.the general fli.rectives of the British tip 
Command. " In this way their pu-rely national character 
wu e8tabliahed. I also llacl it laid clown••not without 
objections on the part of the British--that in no case 
would the volunteers "bear arma against france." That 
c:lic:l not mean that they were never to fijht against rrencb· 
men. The contrary, alae, had to be foreseen, Vichy being 
what it wu and not beina•-far from it--Prance. Jut the 
clause aimed at guaranteein& that Allied military action, 
with which our own was merged, should not, even when it 
came up aaainst the forces of official France, be used 
against thy real France and injure its patrimony or its 
interests. 
But this agreement waa to bring frequent frictions. 
de Gaulle points out: 
It would, in fact, have been more convenient for 
thea, frea the administrative as well as from the 
political point of view, to treat the Free French as 
elements incorporated in tbe British forces and serviees2 rather than as allies full of ambitions and claims • • • 
Nevertheless Free France bad need of everything and 
uraently. After the improvisations of the suuaer and 
autumn, and before the fresh enterprises which I had 
decided to get going in the spring, we bad to obtain from 
the British what was indispensable, w~le maintaining 
towards them a resolute independence. 
•I jHDwever, tbe cases of the Jamake Cold, and Admiral Muselier, 
1 IQ,d., p. 95. 
2 l.PJ.!l.' p. 144. 
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,, 
gave de Gaulle au ink lin& of what he was to be u.p again at. 
1 will not conceal that this lamentable inci4ent 
(Admiral Huaelier) by settia& in relief the element of 
precariousness always presut in our situation relative 
to our allies, 4ii not fail to influence my philosophy 
on the questioo of what sbcN1411. aefinitely be our 
relations with the British ltate.l 
So it was that on January 18, I signed with Heiden 
a ttjurisdic.tion" qreement covering the rree rrench in 
British territory and especially our own courts, which 
would operate "in accord.ance with the national military 
legislation." At the same time we were able to open 
negotiations with the Britiah treasury witb
2
a view to a 
financial, ecooomic and. military aareement. 
De Gaulle analyses the situation: 
lor to resist the lritilh machine, when it set itself 
in motion to iapoae aoraethiaa, was a severe teat. With• 
out bavin& experienced it oneself, it is impoaaible to 
tma&ine what a cooceatration of effort, what a variety 
of proced.ures, wb.at inaisteoce, by turns gracious, 
preasin&, and threateoiaa, tbe &nglish were capable of 
deployin& in orde~ to obtaia aatisfaction.l 
If tbia was so with the British it was alao with 
1 
the .Americans. 
In &oosevelt 's judpMmt, Franca waa an exhausted, 
defeatist confused country which did not correspond. to 
de Gaulle' s perorations about historical &lory and 
arandeur. Because of the few thousand lreochmeo who bad 
left their bomes to joia hta, de Gaulle had ao right to 
1 llUJ!. J p. 148. 
2Ibid· 
3 
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speak on behalf of the Pourth million who appeared to be 
satisfied with Marshal Petain.l 
lance de Gaulle's animosity towards the allies. Whenever any 
of France's interests were at stake de Gaulle would not move 
an inch; War or no war, emeraency or no emeraency, 
capitulation or no capitulation. France today was the same 
france of twenty centuries, and she bad the same sovereignty 
today as she had yester<Uty. Tilts de Gaulle made clear to 
the lri tish and to hiuelf from t.:ha very be&inning. Three 
months had passed since de Gaulle was recoanized the lead~r 
of the Free French. Hardly was his authority established, 
hardly had free france been awakened with leaality and 
sovereignty, when the MUselier incident happened. I can say 
with some degree of assuredness2 that someone else in de 
Gaulle's place would have given in to the British. But not 
so de Gaulle. Once convinced ef his belief, he w~s off on 
I the war path. 3 
What relations? Where would de Gaulle go? Who else 
1Arthur Layton Punk, Charles de Gaulle (university of 
~klaboma Press, 1959), p. 270. 
2
conaiderio& iacidenta with other exile goveromeota 
•nd Great Britain. 
lcharlea de Gaulle, Ike Call to lpoor, p. 148. 
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!but the British could have helped him at his time of need? 
I I Yet he had the t-n.ty ud eouraae to defy the hade 
1: that fed. him. All throup tJte war de Gaulle's relations with 
.I 
Jl the allies were under constant friction. To de Gaulle france 
\ (french Sovereianty aad rreacb Crandeur) was incarnated in 
I 
1rree Prance and therefore alive and fi&htina. To the rest 
I 
!I she wu deacl and buried. 
il Our British partners were aided in this by the 
II natural propensity of the french to yield to foreigners 
and become divided. Amona those of us wbo, in their 
careers, bad had to clo with fore:lp affairs, whether frcnn 
afar or close to, concessioa was DlOSt often a habit, if 
not a principle. TO many, from bavin& lived under a 
regime devoid of consistency, it was practically an 
uod.erstOGd tb.in& that france aever said lo. Therefore, 
at those 111011lents when I wu llolclin& out against the 
British cleaaods, I could see ai&DI, even in my own circle 
of astonishment, uneasiness, anxiety. 
I could hear people wbisperina behind my back and 
could read in people' a eyes the questiouii .. Where does he 
think he's aoin&?n As if it were inconceivable that one 
should ao araywhere but towards acceptance. A8 for these 
Preach emLares who had net rallied to us, they took sides 
aaaiost us almost atoma.tically. Most of them followed 
the bent of their school of politics, for which france 
was always in the wroaa as eooo as abe aaserted herself. 
1 And all diaapproved of de flaulle, whose firmness, which 
they called dictatorial, appeared to them suspect in 
I 
relation to the spirit of aurreacler, which they hacl the 
arrogance to coofouad witb tl\at of tbe republic.l 
I
ll And as the war coatioutid and free rrance or&aoized, so dic:i 
I . 1~ •• PP• 163•164. 
(' 
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the friction with the allies augment. Middle•last, Africa, 
Hadapscar, lforth .America, Asia, wherever French terri tory 
was at stake the war of nerves wita allies was on. 
It is true that, if tbe British often went near the 
limit they never went beyond it. At the right moment 
tbey put the brake on and yielded, at least partially, 
to our firmness. then would follow a period of useful 
collaboration••until suddenly fresh storms rumbled. 
The· Allies must be shown that rree France was in 
their Camp to embody france there, but not to act there 
as cover against the Preach nation, for the abuse! and 
encroacbaents thus Dd.pt coad.t to ita detriment. 
But suddenly the interveation of the Inglish in 
another part of the lmpire brou&bt my uneasiness aad 
invitation to their peak. On May 5, 1942, a telephone 
call fr0111 a press qeacy at three in the mornin& informed 
me that a British squadron wu ladin& troops at Dieao• 
Suavez. Our Allies were occupying a rr~ch possession by 
force without even havin& coasalted us. 
But I publicly rejected any compromise about 
Kaclagucar declaillin& that it was the will of Prance !hat 
her lmplre should be neither divided nor neutralized. 
More pqes could be written aad quoted on de Gaulle's 
!trouble with the allies. It will suffice therefore to say 
1 here that had not de Gaulle risked his prestige as a leader, 
1 Ibid. J p. 1.53. 
2 IJ!,ct., p. 241. 
3 lW·· p. 237. 
4 Ibid·, p. 240. 
27 
had he not visualized french Sovareianty as alive and 
., 
imbedded in hia effort• to continue the war, it ia doubtful 
whether france would have emeraed from the war anything elae 
than a satellite. 
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CIIAPTD III 
Dl GAULLE'S lU.TIOtiLISM II 
11 for de Gaulle tile war years had proved a valuable 
jllllld worthwhile period of trllllai tf.011 • The ad.Utary leader 
.I 
I' jl(wbo aioce his early youth history realized oearly all his 
llpredf.ctiooa) bacl bee...,. 1111 accoaoplf.ahecl political stateamao. 
1
·1•1 the t:l.118 Fr1111ce wu liberated hia role 1111cl his philosophy 
llof State bad cryatalized in ld.s mind, beuce his adament 
/lposition when opposed to co.a.uaiat and other factors who 
,I 
j/were ready to usurp power, and plunae France once more into 
II 
Jlcbaos. De Gaulle was ready foJ: them. 
1:1
1 
Wbat particularly struck me about the regrouping 
11 
parties was their passionate desire to accord themselves 
1
1 
all the powers of the B.epublic in full at the earliest 
\t opportunity, and their incapacity, which they revealed 
II 
in advaace, to wield them effectively. In this respect 
l
i nothing promised any sort of improvement in regard to 
.I the futile maneuverin& which comprised the regime's 
I activity before the war and which had led the country to 
' aueh fearful disaster. Verbally, tbe politicians 
II jealously emulated each other in denying such practices. 
"Revolution!" was the warchword that echoed most loudly 
!I tbrough their speeches. But no one defined just what 
this 111eant, what effective chan&•• were to be made in the 
"' 
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previous situation, and particularly what authority, and 
endowed with what powers, would be in a position to carry 
them out. As for the Communists, they knew what they 
wanted, but were careful not to say what it was. 'Dle 
groups which for all their bold phraseology were 
fundamentally moderate cloaked their circumspection 
beneath Georges lidault's formula, "llevolution by law!'* 
As for the groups and Jr&eo of the Left, or laying claim to 
be such, they appeared riaorous in criticism and 
repudiation, but vape ad quezulous in every construct! v 
issue. R.eceiving delegations, reading newspapers, 
listening to speeches, 1 was inclined to think that for 
the renascent parties the revolution was not an under• 
taking with definite goals implying action and riak, but 
rather an attitude of constant dissatisfaction toward 
every policy, even those they had advocated themselves. 
I did not conceal the apprehensions these signs 
inspired in me. When aovennDental confusion and 
impotence had been the direct causes of our social and 
moral chaos, of our diplomatic weakness, of our 
strategic collapse, and lastly of our national 
renunciation, wbicb bad caat us into the abyss, what evil 
genius, what mad hallucination was leading us toward the 
same quicksands? Given the tremendous problems 
confronting France, how auppose they could be solved eave 
under the aegis of a state both impartial and strong? 
But I was forced to the recoanition that my notion• were 
rarely shared. 
ror myself, the separation of powers, the authority 
of a genuine chief of state, tbe recour1e to the people 
by means of referendua whenever its destiny or its 
institutions were in question--these were fhe necessary 
bases of democracy in a country like ours. 
Here aaa1n we see the separation of powers haunting de Gaulle 
If the chief-of•state is to crusacle for the grandeur of 
mother, then he should do it hia own way listening only to 
1Cbarles de Gaulle, SalvftJon, pp. 116•117. 
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the voice of his inner determination and inner restraint. 
And de Gaulle could easily see himself cloaked with the 
authority of a genuine chief of state; The chief of state 
that would be the arbitor when crista coaes, such as the one 
be was facing at Liberation t~e. 1 
the State in I&me tf Ciiti! 
One can see all throuah bis memoirs and speeches the 
deep and sincere respect de Gaulle cherishes for the 
individual. But in a time of aergency the State has the 
right to intervene on behalf of the people. 
lecause france's bi&her interest is somethin& quite j 
cii.fferent from the immediate aclvantaae of the French •• 2 
Furthermore the greater the confusion the greater 
the neceaai ty to govern. 3 -
lenee tbe function of the State in time of emergency is 
I 
II 
To subordinate private interest to public advantage; 
to exploit the natural resources to the nation and 
administer them to the aeneral advantage: to abolish 
coalition• of interest once and for all; finally, to 
permit each of rrance' a MDI and 4auptera to live, to 
work and to rai1e their children in security and di&nity.~ 
1 li&i· J p. 124. 
2 Ibid-, p. 31. 
J Ibid.' P· 40. 
4 lW·' p. a. 
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The iron-clad rule of States is to give nothina for 
oothina. To raise the work•r' s standard of livin& as 
the rate of production rises, to requisition or 
sequestrate certain public services and enterprises for 
the direct use of the state; to appropriate for the 
nation tbe illegal profits of those who collaborated 
with tbe enemy; to fix commodity prices and reaulate 
colllll8rce as long as what is prochaced and trrosportable 
is not equivalent to consumer ~d. • • • 
State control of the nation's economic rJsources, 
security and digaity assured to each worker. 
MOreover, at a time of a crisis the State must 
discharae two iJDperative obliaations: Justice must be 
rendered and public order aasured. This must be done 
vigorously and without delay.l 
Barsh as thia might sound one day the tears would 
dry, the tranaaressions dia, the tombs disappear, but 
Prance would remain. 4 
For today, as ever, it was incumbent upon the State 
to create the national power which henceforth would 
depend on the economy. Tke latter must therefore be 
directed, particularly since it was deficient, since it 
wst be renovated, 8Lld si1llle it \t/Ould not be renovated 
unless the state deterained to do so. This was, in my 
eyes, the chief motive of the nationalization, control 
and modernization measures adopted by my government. 
But this conception of a aovernment armed to act power• 
fully in the economic domain was directly linked to my 
conception of the state itself. I reaarded the state not 
as it was yesterday and aa the parties wished it to 
32 
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become once •re, a juxtaposition of private interests 
which covld never produce aaythina but weak compromise, 
but instead an institution of decision, action and 
ambition, expressin& aad &ervin& tbe national interest 
alone. In order to make decisions and determine measures 
it must have a qualifiecl arbiter at ita heac!. In order 
to execute th•, it must have servants recruited and 
trained so as to conatttyte a valid and homogeneous corps 
in all public functions. 
So at a time of peace aad security, the State incarnated in 
the leader is to be tile upholder of the Grandeur of France. 
1
1o looser is tbe Sovereian Aaaembly to act as the upholder 
of France's Grandeur. To de Geull~ this is an impossibility. 
Tbis institution ia too veaerable to the tempers and 
temptations of self-centered politicians, to become the 
upholder ot Preach Grao4eur. 
r.D! State lfader Duress 
rroposina to swim the ocean de Gaulle had first to 
stand on firm ground. 
On .June, 18, 1940, in Lo4on he made his famous nx 
.General de Gaulle" speech. Beat clay tells the J'rench it 
is their duty to resist. 
rrenclaea 111Ust now be fully aware that all ordinary 
forma of authority have disappeareci. 
raced by the bewilderment of my countrymen by the 
1,., •• , pp. 111•112. 
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disintegration of a government in thrall to the enemy, 
by the facta that the institutions of my country are 
incapable, at the moment, of functioning, I, General de 
Gaulle, a french soldier aocl llilitary leader, realize 
that I now speak for Prance. 
In the n•• of Prance, I make the following aQl81811 
declaration. It is the bouaded duty of all Frenchmen 
who 8till bear arms to continue the struggle. Por thea 
to lay down their arm., to evacuate any position of 
llilitary importance or aaree to hand over uy part of 
r.rench terri tory' however ama111 to enemy control, would 
be a crime aaainat our country. 
lance by acloptina without compromise the cause of 
national recovery, be believed that be acquired the authority 
But the authority for what? 
~ on with the war? Yea, certainly! But to wbat end 
ancl'withio what 11mitat Haay even amooa those who 
approved of the uodertald.a& wanted it to be no more than 
aid &i ven by a baadful of Preuch to the lri tish Imp ire, 
still standiaa in the filbt. Mot for a moment did I 
look at the enterprise in that way. For me what hacl to 
be served and saved waa the nation ancl the state. • • • 
All for the iJIIID8cliate future, in the name of what were 
some of ita sons to be lecl out to a fight no longer ita 
own? Wbat was the aood. of supplyina the axiliaoa the 
forces of another power! Ro! ror the effort to be worth 
while, it was essential to brio& b!ck into the war not 
merely some rrenehmen t but rraoce. 
low would he then do itt Be would create rree 
rrance--•whicb would safe•auard the honor of the motherland. 
It would be the symbol of national resistance for France, 
1Tb• IR•egpet of i!Dt£•1 de i!lllf, P• 45. 
2charles de Gaulle, call to IQg!r, p. 81. 
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II and in which French •overeipty wae . to be laid, having been 
!brought over, out from disaster until the day it could be 
taken back to France. 
Henceforth for de Gaulle it was a question of either, I 
or. lo couapromise was aclmiasable. It was either the path I 
I of honor, or the path of ahamcu The path of honor bein& the 
I path of leaality aad veated power; the path of sha.e being tb 
I 
~~~ path of treason. 
;I Thus de Gaulle wbile cloaking bis efforts with 
[I legality, refuted that of Vichy' a by refueina to recosoize 
the validity of a government which baa been irregularly 
I I appointed so far aa the french Constitution was concerned, 
I and was, moreover, uncler eaemy eontrol. 1 
II 
11 Bow le&itilllate would his effort• be? Jlere this 
!I q .. ation bothered him. All he recalls later in his -irs, 
when Churchill loaes the postwar election, de Gaulle 
1 complains • • • 
I 
For if his task waa coloasal, at least be found 
himaelf invested by the resular instances of the state, 
furniahed with all the power and provided with all the 
levers of legal authority set at the head of a 
unanimoue people, of a territory still intact, of a 
tremendous empire, and of formidable armies. Whereas I, 
1Jbe Seeeebet of General de Gtplle, p. 45. 
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at the same time, condemned by official powers, reduced 
to notbin1 but the fragments of an army and the vestiges 
of national interest••! bad to answer, alone, for the 
destiny of a nation in the enemy's hands and torn to its 
vitals.l 
Jut the vestige of national interest is what vested I 
I 
I him with the cloak of leaality. In his speech in London on 
1
1 September 23, 1941, concernin& the conatitation of the 
\ l'rench Rational Couaittee he aives his view on the legality 
IJ of his mission. 2 . 
I' 
I MOreover disobedience now not only beca.e acceptable 
:
1 
but a 4uty. 
1: 
I\ To the french I solemnly declare it is their duty to 
l
i revolt aaainst traitors who are handling over our lmpire 
I 
in the same way as they aurrendered the mother country. 
I
. Whenever it is materially poasible foJ a Frencbmau to do 
' so, he DUst refuse to obey these men. 
I 
i 
I 
As time soes by de Gaulle's nationalism crystalizes. 
I llxn a speech given oa December 28, 1942, on patriotism he 
l1 clarifies more his le&iti:macy au:l proposes France was 
I 
II 
1
1 defeated because of the clefeati• of some leader, treasonable 
I 
lintriaue and conspiracies by opponents of the sovereianty of 
I 
, ______________________________________________________ __ 
I 1Cbarles de Gaulle, Stlv&£!on, p. 232. 
§euches of General c:le Gelle, pp. 46-47. 61. 
See also lll!. 
2
'Qle Seeecl!es of General de Sifll&e, p. 72. 
Stbf.d., P• 65. 
" 
~---~~==~================== 
-the people. 
But this was only au episode which frightful as it 
was did not alter the will of the nation as it had been 
expressed while France was still free. rrencbmen owed 
aDd still owe it to thea8elves to obey this will alone.l 
the will being incarnated in free Prance, and this 
rree rrance therefore has taken upon herself to see that 
french sovereignty be administered, that the laws of · 
Prance be applied, that the riahts and interests of 
rrace be represente4 as her b.onor, her soul! and her 
strength have been by the blood and sufferings of the 
nation. An enlarged provitioaal power, groupin& all 
Preach forces inside and outside the country, and all 
French territories capable of fi&htin& for liberation, 
is essential to natioaal indepeadeace and unity ~til 
the natioa itself can express ita aovereian will. 
What are the reasoaa he clid 1 t? One was his love 
for mother france, the second his chuiau of leadership and 
\the third her Grandeur: Tbeae reaaons bein& in my opinion 
!the main drive bebiad de Gaulle's berculian drive. 
R! Gaulle's Stats 
And here ia where de Gaulle's drama starts. 
Conviaced of bis charisma and the righteousness of his 
philosophy of state, be realizes that there might be very 
little that be can do to establi.sb a new reaime. His deep 
1 Ib'!·, p. 187. 
2 Ibid., p. 188. 
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I 
I respect for the individual expressed itself. 
I 
I 
II 
\ 
Our country was in a position to achieve these soala 
if it remained united and the state led it forward. ror 
how could it advance if it were Givided a&ainst itself, 
if it were not guided in ita pro)ress by an autben'tic 
government? Yet, as Prance became free Again, I realized 
with chagrin that her political forces were making great 
efforts to divide her and that on various levels every• 
thing was attempting to sever the nation from me. 
I had every apparent justification for prolonging the 
sort of monarchy which I bad recently assumed and which 
the general consent had sub1equently c·onfirmed. But the 
french people.was itself~ and not any other; if it did 
not desire such a regime nothina could impose it.l 
But he realises also that were he to take the reins 
land act without the coneet~t of the people the nation will 
II 
·\
1\arad.ually turn against .bim.. 
I . l De Gaulle however has to govern until the day the 
nation will be able to··'.Vote. Jut be has to influence the 
'eople on what is good for them. 
That the Third Republic had constantly failed to 
achieve equilibrium, finally collapsing in an abyss of 
capitulation, gave each party reasons to attack the 
others in ita own behalf. but not tbe necessity to 
abjure the same weaknesses. That Prance could not re• 
establish herself without the cohesion of her people, 
the abnegation of actions, aad the leadership of a 
recognized and continuous authority was a principle 
altQ@etber alien to their universe. For them, on the 
contrary, it was a matter of opposing all competitors, 
i>f provoking those passions and claias by which they 
could support themselves, of seizing power not so much 
1 Ibid., p. 270. 
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to serve the eotire natioa as to fasten their own 
particular program to 1 t. That de Gaulle, having 
succeeded in unitin& the aatioa and leading it to 
salvation, should now be kept at its head was not the 
way they envisioned the future, though they were careful 
to lavish their praises upcm bia now. For tomorrow, 
they conceded, his withcb:awal could not occur without 
certain traositione. !hey even attempted to create soae 
sort of decorative position to which he could be relegate~. 
Yet none of them supposed that leadership could loa& 
remain in the hands of a person whose mere presence was 
evidently incompatible with their reaime. 
To the parties' fractioaal character, which infected 
thea with weakness, was ...W.ct their own decaclence. The 
14tter was still concealed beneath rhetoric, but the 
doctrinal passion which was once tbeir source, their 
attraction and their areatneas could not be maintained 
in a period of aateriali-. .. indifferent to ideals. lo 
longer inepired by priaciples, no longer ambitious to 
proselytize since they found no audiences on these 
arouacls, they were inevitably ten41ng to degradation, 
shrinkin& until each bee ... nothing more than the 
representation of a cateaory of iaterests. If the 
government fell into tbeir bands aaain, it was certain 
that their leaders, their cleleaatea and their militaat 
members would turn into professioaala makin& a career 
out of politics. !be cooqaeat of public functions, of 
influential positions. of administrative sinecures would 
henceforth absorb tbe parties and limit their activities 
to what they called tactics • which was nothing aore than 
the practi•• of compromise and denial. Since all were 
minority representatives, they would have to ahare the 
positions of command with tbeir rivals in order to accede 
to them at all. Aa a result they would proceed by &iving 
themselves the lie in relation to the electorate. While 
the conat~t juxtaposition, witbia the aovernment, of 
conflictinf groups and men could result only in 
impotence. 
The solitude which keeps the charismatic leader 
lQa,g., p. 272. 
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I company is excellently portrayed above. De Gaulle, unable 
I 
I: 
li 
I 
I 
! 
to experience intimacy or solidarity, fights back. He is 
stuck in isolation and is uoable to understand other people. 
Bence hi a fight qainat the political parties. However, he 
couches up this fiaht in the IIUtle of leadership. 
As I saw it, the state ••t have a head, that is, a 
leader in whom tbe nation could aee beyond ita own 
fluctuations, a man in charae of essential matters and 
the auarantor of ita fate. It was also necessary that 
this executive, destined to serve only the national 
community, not ori&inate in the parliament which united 
the deleaationa of particular interests. These 
conditione implied that tbe chief of state not belona 
to a party, that he be deai&nated by tbe people, that he 
be empowered to appoint the Cabinet, that he possess the 
ri&ht to consult the nation, either by referendum or by 
election of assemblies, that he receive, finally, the 
man4iate of inaurina the inteari ty ud independence of 
Prance in caae of dancer. leyond those circumatances 
when it would be the President's duty to intervene 
publicly, aovernmeut ancl parli-.nt would collaborate, 
the latter controllin& the former and authorized to cause 
ita fall, but the national maaiatrate exercisina his 1 arbitration and having recourse to that of the peeple. 
J, lere at last is de G•lle's conception of a State. 
'!Derived not from •tqhyaical aad traoaceaCiental idea, but 
'\from bitter experience. Tbe flll8Stion now was to be 
implemented. with ''Prance's" (people's) authority. 
Aa he says in bia memoira, three solutions were 
~available to the French nation. 
40 
lither return to yesterday's ways and weaknesses, 
separately elect a chamber of Deputies and a Senate, and 
then unite them at Versailles in a Itational .bsembly 
which either will or will not modify the 1875 
constitution. Or else reaard this constitution as 
extinct and proceed to elections for a Constituent 
Assembly which Will do what it thinks best. Or a basis 
for determinioa its wishes ana to wbich its represent&• 
tives would have to conform. · I did net specify which 
was my own cboice, but it could be passed from the very 
fact that I invoked the hypothesis of a referendtiml.l 
His experience speaks once more: 
My refereodua project bad a triple end in view. 
Since the 1875 system had beeu swept away by 1940's 
disaster, it seemed to me that it would be arbitrary 
either to re-establish it myself or to forbid its return. 
After all, the sovereico nation was there to decide the 
matter. Altbouah I bad no doubt as to its response, I 
would ask the people if it desired to return to the 
Third &epublic or to create another. l'urther when the 
people's vote bad obliterated tbe old constitution, tbe 
new one would have to be elaborated by the Assembly which 
would eraerae from the elections. lut wat this Assembly 
be omnipotent, 4etarmin1aa the national institutions 
exclusively and finally, poseeasin& all ri&hts without 
exception, restraint or appeal? Ro! Thanks to the 
referendum, a balance could be set up between its powers 
and tbe aovern..ats', ao tbat the constitution 
subsequently elaborated would be subject to approval by 
universal suffrage. lbe referendum, then instituted as 
the first and the last act of the constitutional under-
taking, would provide me tbe opportunity to apeak 
directly to every frenchmen aud would furnish the latter 
the occasion to approve or disapprove of my attitude on 
a subject affectin& the nation's destiny for 
aenerationa.2 
41 
ll!W!·' p. 290. 
21b&d., p. 291. 
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-But he realized that france bad not yet learned her 
luaon. 
Jut while the people's sentiment showed they were 
ready to rise above all divisions, to follow de Gaulle 
on the road to national ~ecovery, and to approve his 
intentioaa of iastitutin& a atrons state, political 
activity took the contrary direction. All •Y severn-
meat's decisions and att1tu4es were now received witb 
criticism or resentment ou the part of the various 
factions. ltlle "politicians'' exhibi_te4 1'10\JQtin& cation a 
ay regard. 
Tbaa the political factions divided as they were 
between creation of an omaipotent Assembly and tbe 
return to the old system, were unanimous in rejecting 
my own conceptions. Tbe prospect of a direct appeal to 
the nation seemed scandalous to all of them. llothina 
abowed more clearly to what distortion of the meanin& of 
democracy the spirit of faction led. Accordipg to tbe 
parties, the lapublic should be their property, the· 
oatioa beina sovereign only to deleaate its rights and 
even ita free will to the men which they selected for 
it. Further, my concern to assure the aovernment'a 
autbority and effectiveness conflicted with their 
fund&Dl8Dt&l nature. They instinctively believed the 
state abould be weak ao they could manipulate it more 
readily and win from it got so much the means of action 
as office an4 influence.Z 
But it is not just isolation. lis sense of a crusader 
is now clearly seen. He baa a compulsive drive to eliminate 
opposition. B1a opponents in Africa aad now france prove 
the point. Be caanot share.. Seeina Mmaelf as trusted with 
lib, •• , p. 290. 
2.,1W., p. 293. 
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Certainly it would be before the end of the month. 
Por the constitutional debate would then begin, and I 
was convinced that by remtaains in the nascent regime 
I would not bave the possibility of imposing my views 
nor even of supporting thea. The draft which the 
committee created by the C.nstitueat Assembly had 
prepared was precisely the converse of what I considered 
necessary, inatitutin& •• it did the absolute government 
of a sinale aad sovereiaa Aaaembly; the executive having 
no;other role thaD to applJ what was prescribed; the 
President of tbe Council bei.ac elected by the parliament 
ad. pend.tted te form his Cabinet only after passing a 
thoroup exadnation as to his tend.encies and platform 
ud aa8\11DJ.ng cOJIBd.tments wbich w011ld severly bind him 
beforehand. As for the President of the Republic, it 
was agreed, after many hesitations, that there might be 
one, though he must be deprived of any political role 
and not have the sli&btest effect on the machine of 
1 lb&9·' p. 310. 
2.12!!·. 
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state--in other words, be the prisoner of this insipid 
symbolic function. Tbia was probably the position 
intended for General de Gaulle by those who were callina 
the tune. MOreover~ the committeemen, as well as the 
parties, were careful not to have any communication with 
me on the subject. Once, when I summoned the chairman, 
M. Francois de Menthon, to inquire as to the progress 
made, I was told that the .A.aaembly and its committee 
considered that I was not to participate in the debate, 
since I was not a member ~eelf. UDder such conditions, 
to attempt to pursue my goals in thia crucial area aa in 
all othfr respects would he to invite impotence and 
insult. 
So on January 20, he fiaally admits it. Not bein& 
able to get the poeple themselves to cast their choice~-not 
wantin& to use dictatorial means be will withdraw. 
Tbe exclusive re&ime of parties has reappeared. I 
disapprove of it. Jut aside from establishing by force 
a dictatorship which I do not desire and which would 
certainly end in disaster, I have not the means of 
preventing this experiment. I must therefore withdraw.2 
Colombey-les•Deux•l&lises from now on becomes 
cle Gaulle • e llba. Prom here he would continue his struagle 
for what be believes to be the salvation of Prance. On 
June 16, 1946, at Bayeux on the anniversary of his visit 
there in 1944 he reiterates his beliefs.l 
In 1947 he creates the INseiBblement du Peuple 
1 i-&d., pp. 319•320. 
2 lW·' p. 325. 
3
stanley Clark, Jbe Mfn !9! l! Fsance, pp~ 212•213. 
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I francais (Blf) to help acbieve the salvation. 
The time has come to form a Ially of the Franca 
people, to launch a areat united effort to win our 
national salvation, to brina about reform of our 
Constitution, aod to triu.ph by fonstitutional means 
over our differences of opinion. 
Aod on April 15, de Gaulle issues a press statement. 
Ivery Frenchman kDowa that in tbe present situation 
the fate of the country. and of every-citizen, is at 
stake. Ivery F•eochlaaa believes that if economic 
pro•perity, ••~441 justice, tmperial unity, aad influence 
abroad are to be puantaecl••witbout which we IIIAY lose 
the very liberty of each incliviclual citizen and the 
independeoce of rrance••the wbole country must unite in 
a prolonged and miahty effort of recovery • • • 
II 
Ivery Frenchman feels that the present system must 
make way for another, in which executive power proceeds 
from the country, aot froa political parties. and 
irreconcilable conflicts are appeased by the people 
itself. 
Tbe Ially of the Preach People is officially created 
toclay. I assuaae its leadership. Its purpose is to 
proaaote the union of our people and the2reform of our state over and above oatioaal division. 
I 
I 
i 
I 
\ lut the Sacred Call would not come until May, 1958. 
'I ~~ fr1111ce'a inatf.tutf.ona which bad pendtt:ed crbh to rei&n 
1 since de Gaulle bacl re•iped, now broupt about the Alaerian 
I l crisis, and the fall of the Fourth lepublic. 
I Once more Destiny played into de Gaulle's hands. 
Ilia prophesies materialized once JDGre. De Gaulle, now 
1J]!1d., p. 214. 
4S 
~ 2lbid., pp. 214·215. 
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supreme••the chosen child of God's, as the french say--was at 
last free to act unrestrained by traditional french thouaht. 
~ --
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CHAPTII. IV 
Till tiARS OF GLOI.Y 
The story of what happened in Al&iers that finally 
~rouaht cle Gaulle back to power has been written maoy times. 
~eve~~ 1 •hall try from this chapter on to confine myself 
~nly to those historical facta in wbich de Gaulle, by using 
~is char:L'Itma, overcame--in the weeks and months that followed 
~he Al&iera putsch--the crisis that other Prencb leaders bad 
!failed to cope with and thus impleuaent his political 
philosophy. For to de Gaulle the crises were the results of 
~ antiquated political ayatea. 
The crisis was not new in kind. Crises had been 
plaauin& rraace since the end of World War II. The dis-
laemberment of the lmpire and political anarchy due to an 
Jntiquatecl constitution were tbe contributing reasons. And 
ret none of the french state._n bad the support to muster 
~at of the material haa been taken from Alexander 
~erth'a boo~lbf df i!llle aevslgt&on, to which I am much 
=~~==~~~n=4e=b~t~ed~·~========================================~======= 
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jeaou&h courage to face the crisis with statesmanlike fervor. 
I 
I Only one, Mendes•l'rance, was able to break from tradition, 
I 
and dictate hi1 controversial Indo•Cbina policy in spite of 
I the oppo1itiorls strong protests. Ilia end, however, was not 
unlike the rest. 
rbe present crisis was no differeat from any of tbe 
lpaat. Insubordination of the army and political quibbling 
!I ia tbe 4sa....,ly--haace beCI aoae tbrou&h tbia aeveral u-•. 
IThia time, however, certain conditions were different: 
1. The political cliute had been saturated with 
criaia. 
2. The powers behind the insurrection were seeing 
them.elves aa a political party power, with 
de Gaalle aa their leader. 
3. A timely and stron& resurrection of appeals and 
article& of ''lrins•back•de•Callen in tbe Pari• 
preas by old llF Gaulliata (like Triboulet) and 
liberals (like Mauriac). 
Coupled with tbia waa the fact that the public and 
1
the military bad reacbed a blah point of intolerance of 
j "government by comproad.ae. .. Governaents like Pinay 1 a and 
Mollet' a, Teit&en 'a and now lflimlin 'a were tryins to rule 
41 
by compromise and/or collaboration between ri&bt and left fo 
the sake of aovernin& rather tban tbe aoverned. Tbey had 
&iven the country nothina but under the table deals that 
solved short-tiae crises while leavin& the chaotic political 
situation to ita disintqration. A break from this was now 
need.ed.. 
Por this reason, de Gaulle was thou.gb.t as the only 
person strong enoup.:not to compromise and still put the 
1:\ouse in order. After. all, ·vas he not the one that once 
before led rrance to greatoeasT Was he not the one who 
witb.d.rew from political life ra.ther than compromise his 
principles? Was he not the oae that disinherited his own 
supporters when they started compromising? Was be not the 
one aakin& for a strona presideatial reaime, whose leader 
would be above political quibblioaa ana deals? Was be not 
the one wbe hated poUtical parties because they served only 
personal and selfish interests! Was he not the one that tbe 
visions of the Grandeur of rraace, ud with clean enoup 
hands to lead this France to sreatneas once more? 
In a way, therefore, the clamouring for the return 
of de Gaulle to power cannot be described as unnatural. 
!Many have tried to insinuate that de Gaulle was in the 
~--=-==~========~-==-======== 
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planning of thinga from the very beainning. Treno, in the 
• • • a year aao, General de Gaulle came to power. 
Countless books and articles have been written about it; 
and froa all these it appears that hundreds of friends 
of General de Gaulle, huodreu of disciples of General 
de Gaulle, hundreds of e~~~Ployees of General de Gaulle, 
hundreds of domeat:l.cs of General de Gaulle scattered 
tbrou&hout the pelitical life of tbe country, scattered 
throupout the Army, the Police, the Secret Service 
networks, etc. , etc. , were ·se·cretly preparing the 
Geaeral' s return to power, . but that the General knew 
nothing--just nothing at ail. !t·. waa like mother's 
birthday when the little ones are secretly preparina for 
Mwmay her present 4ncl her ·bunch of flowers, with her 
kuowiog nothing, absolutely nothing about it. 
'*General! " 
''tea, my dears? .. 
"General, we've pt a eurpriae for you. .Just look 
what we've put on this tray for you!" 
"Jut bow lsnaaAy! pte Itaya of the Blysee! But, my 
de&J;•, yov •iula ~. " 
However, oo matter how .. ch the left wanted to 
believe this te be so, there ia little proof to hack it up. 
On the contrary: 19.58 ha4 bepu and in the prden of La 
liosaerie at Coloabey, de Gaulle said to oae of his closest 
frieada, "I had hoped tbat I aboulci be called last year. 
l•ow I 'be&fo to fear that it is too late. "2 
1Alexander Werth, 11\e ,9! §glle levolys;,gg (London: 
Iebert Bale Ltd., 1960), p. SO. 
2
stanley Clark, Jbe Mfp i)o &a lr1Qse, p. 222. 
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llevertbeless, that de Gaulle was waitins for "the 
1 Call •• was no secret. But the call had to be unmistakably 
jclear, from the right direction and without blackmail. 
lj Otherwise be would not have it. Furthermore, he would have 
I 
jit his owa way. Unlimited power of aoveming, dissolution 
\of political parties, and a new constitution that would 
I 
!change the regime of Prance to a presidential one. 
[I Moreover, aa one tracaa historical facts, one 
cannot help but see that up to the moment when de Gaulle 
i! was invested as Premier with the extraordinary powers, be 
I jcounted strictly on bis cbarieaa to achieve his aims. It 
11• only after his invaatitura tbat be sat up an excellent 
1
1 organization to run his public relations. ly using his 
lj charisma •• a starting point, he was able to fulfill his 
ljll1881on by iaopl.....,.tin& his political philosophy, thue 
jfounding the Pifth Republic. 
. In the midst of a political crisis such demands as 
I de Gaulle was making would not only have been unacceptable to 
I 
the Preach Aaaembly••by any stretch of the imagination--but 
they would have been branded as fascist, totalitarian, 
dictatorial, et al;_,,aa they were so branded by the majority 
,{,, 
of the socialists early in the crisis. Atf'(f yet the fact 
=~~===F============================== 
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remains that within two weeks f~m the Al&lers putsch, de 
Gaulle was able to convince bis critics that in spite of what 
tbey called him, he was the only one to save france. llot 
because be had the power but simply because he bad the 
chariama.. lis aloofaeas, IIIJaticism aad secrecy which be 
preached since he published Lt 111 de &'lpee and which he 
practiced while waitin& at C.lo.bay, were the cbariamatic 
trai ta that toclay were beina aCNpt by the powers behind the 
putsch, and by the french people. lie wrote: 
Tbe passion to act by ODe's self il accompanied by a 
certain rou&haess. The man of character embodies the 
harsbness iahereot in his effort. lis subordinates feel 
it, and often suffer fr:oa it. Such a cbief is distant, 
because authority does not ao witb.out prestiae, •f 
prestiae .,es aot p with.eut ciistaaces bein& kept. 
All these charismatic traits bad worked for hi• 
before in 1940 and 194.5. Aod there was no reason why they 
should not work now. lis aenae of rdsaion and his sanae of 
history had never failed him before. Ria complete detacbment 
at Colembay, bia non•aupport of IU.s ewn &Fl Gatllist Party, 
strenathened hia f.maae as the non-partisan, the one destined 
by provid.enee to save l'ruce. And the Alaerian putsch would 
finally prove it. Aa Alexander Werth put it: 
1Alexaoder Werth, Xb• 4e SMlle &evolus&on, p. 38. 
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-• • • De Gaulle knew that the Algerian problem was 
becomina more aud more inextricable, and seeaed convinced 
that only a man of his exceptional, indeed unique, 
authority could settle it. But such passions had been 
arouse4 over Alaeria tb.at no reacly-made solution could be 
proposed ri&ht away; only by observina the rules of tbe 
utmost secrecy, as described in L! fi\ de l'eptf, could 
anythina be acaieved at all. To avoid any explosion, it 
waa essential, for a very loaa tt.e, to keep ax•&ybgdy 
aueasina. Ooly a maa of de Gaulle's presti&e could 
possibly do this. And, wbeD it came to the point, what 
had only been sterile Rll&ldlr• before (such as Mollet's 
·~ease.-:-fire, elections, oeptiations'' triptych) could 
perhftpS becoye a live !O&,S! in the hands of de 
Gaulle ••• 
'that is why it is difficult to believe that cle Gaulle 
was involved in the plaaning of the Alaeriaa putsch. On the 
contrary, if he were to leaa fraace to her deatiny he had to 
do it his way: Dictated by no one, and responsible to no 
I oae. llellce: 
1. De Gaulle's detacbMnt from all plots that Algier 
"activists .. ad "Gaullistsn had cooked up to 
brio& lWa to power. 
1. lis refusal to oei~ con4emn or support their 
plote. 
3. lle complete silence to the insurgents demands 
that he apeak out. 
1 D&d., p. 40. 
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4. lis refusal to answer any questions that 
politicians would aak ht. concerning his 
political philosophy. 
1 .. would first bave to be aiven the power leaally, 
I 
j and thea be would. act. 
I 
I lbf C£11&• 
!I 
I Tbe lona wait for de Gaulle waa finally payin& off. 
I 
I Hay 13, 1958, nAl&iera had becoae the capital of Praoce, and 
the lobbies of the National .UH&Ibly were replaced by the 
pavemelts of the l'Ue Micbelet. "1 Thit was ioevitable. The 
,-.. war in Alaiera bad lastecl too l•ng, and oone of the incom1.na 
I 
1 &overoments bad the way to end. it, at the satisfaction of 
all concerned. The lLI waa aettin& stronger thaD ever, and 
none of the govermaei.lts showed sips of bein& able to control 
I its rebel actiri.tiea. Mollet • s triptych bad become a slogan 
I 
that neither the Preach nor the rebels seemed. to take 
seriously any more. 
However, one thin& was certains All parties 
concerned wanted ao end to the Alaeriao war. These parties 
were the laropeaaa of Al&iers; the Army; the Paris 
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politicians. aad the "Gaul list network." Each in their own 
way wautecl the war to e.Dd but to their own advantage. And, 
strangely euoup, each of these saw in cle Gaulle the person 
that could do it. 
The luropeaa Algerians wanted all out war against the 
rebels. HOwever seein& that tbia was now impossible to 
achieve, they demancled complete integration of Arabs and 
Europeans. In their own mind tlley rationalized their 
importaace to Preach Al&iera. '1'bis ia understandable since 
to them it ia a matter of life or death. They saw in de 
faulle the person to do it. 
I As for the ~y, Indo-China had started a process 
I ~hicb finally crrstallized in Alaeria. One of the reasons 
jwhy Mendes-rrance hastened to arant internal autonomy to 
~niaia was because of an acute shortaae for troops in Hortb 
jlfrica. llot having the time to bring the hardened troops 
~rom Iado•Cbina to Berth Africa, tunisia bad to be sacrificed. 
~en tbese mea were brougbt to Africa, however, trouble 
!~tarted.l 
I Alexander Werth says: 
1 lJW!. J p. 208. 
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It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the bulk of 
the officer cadres and moat of the hardened troops wbo in 
subaequent months were to begin to pour into Algeria were 
men who had foupt for years in Indo•China. Tbeae men 
were embittered against the Republic, and its mistakes 
and failures of the lnc:lo•China campaiga. Later the Suez 
fiasco was to add to their bitterness agaiust the Paris 
government. ~ 
!bus tbe army in Alaeria started in 1956 to dominate 
the Paris aoveJ:Qment, and. becomiog increasingly an iadependen• 
political force, which was determined to dictate ita will. 
Soae of the aenerala were Gaulliats, others were not. Bow• 
lever, aa early aa December, 1957, General Masau told an 
Italian paper that "De Gaulle alone could clean up the mess." 
f" This should not be surpriaing alnce the army in Algiers had 
become a party .. complete vita a propqanc:la macbine as well 
aa a precise political proara.: Iatearation of Algeria, de 
Gaulle • s return to power, vote of a new authoritarian 
COD 8 ti tutiOD • n2 
Aa to the Gaullist network, it ia intereating to 
note that up to the 13th of May it was almost non-existent 
in Algiers. At least it must not have been important enoup, 
1 JW., p. 209. 
2Ib&d. 
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I•• tbe firet version of the c...ittee of Pablic Safety 
I! included no Gaulliata, apart froaa Maasu. Soustell waa still 
in France demanding the formation of a Government of "union 
and salvation. n And it is questionable that he saw de 
IQaalle before his eecape to Al&ier• enG jeinin& with the 
1iinauraenu. 1 
1 However, a small croup did exist: lt waa a number of 
i I persona who were coaetantly tbinkiaa of 4e Caulle as the 
savior of france. With the f*artk Republic rapidly decaying, 
they were convinced that the moaeat waa near when they could 
bring de Gaulle back to power. fhese were the ones that did 
!!everything in their power to put the name of de Gaulle on 
lj everybody • a lip a. 
I ~tar aa the Paris politicians went, their situation 
waa pitiful. In the aaa-.bly the coamuniats were unoraanized 
and ill prepa'C'ed. Tbe aocialiata were divided, the center 
I 
'' ·, 
waa fruatrat:ed, and tbe right waa weak. One majority made 
of the aocialiata, the center and the ri&bt did not want a 
:I 
1 popular front to replace the preaeat system. Another 
majority made of 
·I 
l1 Gaulle either. 
the left and the center did not want de 
1
'----------------------------------
S7 
lTb~A. -~~==~=====·=·=:==============================9F===== 
Thus all the assembly except a few Gaullists were 
willing to go a long way to keep either from happenina. Por 
this reason--after de Gaulle made hia first statement•-the 
assembly decided by overwhelmina majority to back Pflimlin 
to the hilt. On May 16, it voted in the bill establishing 
three months a "state of emeraencyn in France, an extension 
of the state of emergency in Alaer1a. thua giving the 
government very wide powers against anyone or anything 
liable to endanger public order and security and national 
defense. 1 But his was done mDre or less in a half hearted 
way, for deeply in their conscience they secretly admitted 
that de Gaulle's tide was risina. 
As far as tbe aoveromeat went, it was in no better 
concli tion . Pflialin, the last Premier of the J.ourtb 
Republic showed some unquestionable moral courage at first; 
after a time however both physically and taentally exhausted., 
he could. no longer ce)fe with the situation. 
Moreover, Jules Koch, ainister of the interior, 
armed with exceptional emaraeacy powers--more important thaD 
•ny of those at the disposal of any other minister of the 
interios--refused to act in spite of the fact that be knew 
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of Arma Regional Commanders wbo were in sympathy with 
JA.lgiers. As he claiml!o he was anxious to avoicl tw<> tbinaa: 
I -
(1) A Pranco coup (i.e., military putsch) and (2) a Prague 
coup which might baV"e become possible if a "workers ndlitiau 
had been allowed to take shape.l 
De Gaulle's message of embarkation on the regular 
'I process was Mocb' s salvation. When be heard it he "si&bed 
with immense relief--for in his opinion•• only de Gaulle 
could now restore order and discipline in the army.2 
ltb,cl. , p. 177. 
21b&d. , p. 180. 
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Til CIWUSMATlC PUBLIC ULA.TIOIJS lWI 
This wae the situation wheo de Gaulle finally decided 
Ito apeak up. 'fb.e day was Hay 1.5, 1958. Bis uaesaaae is a 
... terpiece of r.&. statement. 
The dearadatioo of tbe State inevitably leaas to the 
alienation of the people aseociated with Prance, to 
confusion in the f1&ht1n& forces, to national dislocation, 
ad to the loss of iodepead.eace. raced with probleaa tGO 
baret for a reaLM of rarties to tackle, rraoce has, for 
the last twelve years, been following a disastrous roacl. 
In tbe paat, the cou.atry, froa ita very depths, 
entrusted me with the task of leading it to its 
salvation. 
Today, with the new orcleala facia& it, let the cOUDtr, 
bow that1I • ready to aaauae the powers of the l.epublic. 
~ atronaly doubt if a more efficient r.&. statement waa ever 
~tten for such an occasion. 
Everybody could read into it everything be wanted to 
~ead into it. Tbe inauraenta claimed it as their victory, 
because it "clearly'' conclened the Coaaittee of Public Safety. 
1 l.k&.!!·' p. 92. -~~==~==================================~===== 
I 
On the otber band, the absence of any reference to Alsiera 
made those who wanted action asaiaet tbe in.uraents think 
that be would not support them. The truth of the story is 
that de Gaulle was playina with hie chari.... Projecting his 
I virtues, the task of lea41na, and his willingness to uaume 
I 
1 tb.e powers of tile lapublie to lead the country back to 
lareataeas, he let bia critics and supporters read into his 
I 
cryptic maasaae whatever they wanted. 
from this point on, aad up to the moment of his 
'investiture as Premier, de Gaulle's P.R. methods start 
deviating from tbe traditioaal pattern of political r.a. 
we are all aware of. Be had no set program, no platform, 
no campaip, no~.·oraaoization, ao ra41o or TV interviews, ao 
public opinloo polla, DO cleciclecl strate17.. Wbat be had was 
a certain theme, a symbol, u4 aa •peal which through the 
years be bad btailt around bta. These were kept simple, clear 
and to the point. 
Tbe theme waa his cbar:l.ama, the symbol was the 
I Greatness of rraoce, the appeal was for bill to save france 
from destruction. These were his credentials and his tools 
to achieve his alma. 
To a traditional P.R. man in politics, to embark 
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on .. cb a venture with only these attributes would have been 
sheer suicide. Por who would tbink that in tb.is day of mass 
communicatioa and propaaanda one could achieve his a1ma by 
being elusive and secretive? fet de Gaulle would have it no 
other way. lot evea a spobaaan wa1 ia si&ht to help when 
he ckove to Paria to aeet with all those who wanted to see 
him. l'urtbentox-e, no c._niquea were published, no press 
releases were distributed. le kept people auessing•-bis 
tx-aditioaal conception of leM.erahip••up ·.:to the 110ment be 
was ready to proceed. 
Given the same circumataacea, I doubt if otbera•-in 
Prance or elaewbere••would have bad the sli&btest of chances 
1
to aurvlve. Jut not so cSe Galle. 
le wanted power bestowed upon bia (legally) not 
because the masses or tbe arm, or the assembly were asking 
lfor 1t, but aboply l>ecauae he vu de Gaulle, the chart-tic 
leader that could save France. Aaain the simple theme of 
_cbarisu, tbe symbol of areatness and. tbe appeal to save 
ranee from destruction. 
For this reason, frea the be&innin& of the crisis, 
refused to meet with any of tbe inauraenta while neither 
ondemning them as the assembly was asking him to do nor 
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condoning their acts, as the ~y was asking. He met 
secretly and mystically with all those concerned in the 
government, but refuse4 to help. Only when be waa sure that 
the call had. come did he make hia fa.ua announcement that 
he "had embarked on tbe replar process of fondng a 
government. u lo uaoutbpiece, no oration, no cU~Paign. His 
charisma, and only his charisma, should brin& him his 
laurels. 
One may arpe at tbia point, however, that under 
the circumatances France bad no other choice. I would 
therefore like to regress a little here and show that there 
were several other alternatives, that could have been taken 
by President Coty or the pvermaent, and which could have 
been just as effective in overcoming the crisis. 
The first alternative was that since Soustelle 
was tbe instrument which had. overthrown Mollet, it was only 
natural that President Coty would consider bim, as much as 
the others, to form tbe government. Moreover, it should be 
reaembered that Soustelle c .. ld. have had influence over the 
insuraeots in Algiers, since he was the early hero of the 
in.urrectiooists. Being the staunch supporter of a French 
Alaeria in the Assembly, be was looked upon as one to save 
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Algeria. furthermore, being a Gaullist--and the secretary 
l&eneral of the IFP••be could have very well followed de 
1 caulle's proaram of action and implemented the changes in 
the constitution just like Pflimlin did. 
The second alternative waa that Pflimlin once he 
I 
laot what he was aaking--establiahing a three month state of 
emergency in Prance, an extension of the state of emergency 
in Algeria and a reform of the eonstitutiOD••could at least 
have tried to implement some order beforehe gave in to de 
!Gaulle. That be had no choice because the insurgents were 
\calling for de Gaulle, Pflialin himself admitted on the 
assembly floor on May 20th, that "contact was never broken 
between the aovernment and the authorities in Al&iera" and 
that several times he -a.roved of the insuraents' actions.l 
The third alternative was Mendes•France•s su&aestion. 
Why should de Gaulle not conclemn the insurgents and thus 
strengthen the presm t and leaal aovernm.entt If de Gaulle's 
real interest lay in the salvation of Prance, be could very 
I 
!well help the present government regain its power by 
!categorically rejecting the support the insuraents were 
I 
II giving him. 
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A lot can be said about these alternatives; however, 
I this is not my aim. I am not sugestia&· here that any of 
j these three choices would have saved France from its decayin& 
I 
condition. What I am sayin& is that the crisis could have 
been overcome just like all the other crises were without 
the help of de Gaulle. Furthermore, what I am suggestio& 
Its that the only variable factor in this crisis was de Gaulle s 
charisma that threw the balance to hie favour. 
Once the curtain bad raised on May 15, de Gaulle had 
to act. Prom Hay 13, when the insurrectionists first 
started clamorin& for de Gaulle, to tbe 15th, his complete 
silence had built for him the 1--ae of a question mark. His 
Hay 15th cryptic measaae enforced it. 
lie next act is another cla•aic •tudy of a P.l. 
communicatioas • • • the press confereace. ly May 18 the 
whole world had bean worked up to the cliaax. Was de Gaulle 
il to take over or not? Would he compromise with national 
1 a8sembly and save France, or would he in•iat on the assembly 
lcommittin& hara-kiri, and his takina over their dead bodies? 
De Gaulle decided to answer tbrou&h a press conference. 
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One can well ima&ine how packeo was the Palais 
d'Orsay lon& before de Gaulle showed up. Tbe pattern be 
followed was simple--a stat~nt, and then a question and 
aaawer period. lt is an iatarestin& study of P.&. of a man 
witbout power, and yet •~ron& eaouah to stick to bia 
principles, no matter how eratic ~ey seemad at the moment. 
The result was a quiet de G·aul.le, with a tongue in cheek for 
the politicos, arrogance for his old critics, encoura&in& 
to the doubters, and non•commital to the insurrectionists. 
Only a charismatic could have 'been this way, and yec get 
away with it. Rot one word to offend any one, not one word 
of contradiction. 
The initial st&t4ilD.ent wu short. He said that 
three years aao be bad decided to reuin silent until the 
time he could aaain serve bia country. Since then, thin&a 
deteriorated to this "arave national crisis." "But," he 
added, "this mi&ht also mark the be&inning of a kiad of 
resurrection," suaaesting that he looked upon the Alaerian 
putacb as a mixed bleas1ng. 1 
JW; now felt he could be useful to Frauce. ror this 
he gave three reasons. 
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(1) Bis nmoral capital"-·or his charisma--may still 
'j count in France, in the Empire, as well as in other countries 
After all, under his rule in the past many ~mportant things 
j bave been achieved. 
I 
j, 
(2) Secondly, I may also be useful becuase the 
exclusive reaime of Parties--will never solve the 
enormous problems facing us, particularly that of our 
association with the people of Africa and the different 
communities of Alaeria • • • 
(3) finally be said be could be useful because be 
I belonged to no Party or to any organization. 
I am a man who belongs to nobody, and who belongs to 
everybody. • • • Vseful••but bow? Well, just as durin& 
the last areat national crisis, by placing myself •t the 
head of the french Republic, if cbe people wish it. 
I It wu clear after this that de Gaulle wanted to be 
placed at the bead of the government by "exceptional" but 
legal methods; and through the question aad answer period be 
played to the audience. To tboae of bia critics who wanted 
him to intervene and stop the rebellion, his arrogance was 
downri&ht satirical. He said: 
There are some who treat as rebels the Army leaders 
who have not been punished by the Government and who, 
iadeed, have been dele&ated government•l authority in 
Alaeria! Bow, I am not tbe Government; ae why should 
anybody expect me, in the circumstances, to treat these 
1 Ibj.d. J p. 108. 
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Army leaders as rebels? (loud laughter) In this tr8fedy1 
one ouaht to be serious•aioded. I'm tryin& to be it. 
It seemed clear to de Gaulle that to achieve his end 
leaally he should play it up to the MOllet socialists. He 
could depend on the right and probably moat of the center to 
help him into office; but the socialists had the key. Hence 
bis co.,liments to Guy Mollet. "Complete with the clear 
suyestion that under a differeat reatae Mollet could show 
bis real worth far inore than befor•l "2 
I ro a political r.~ .an these overtures to Mallet 
!would be the most si&nificant ~assage in tbe whole of de 
" Gaulle's press conference. 'J.'b.ese compliments must have been 
Jcarefully calculated in advance. 
Be actually started re.iniacin& about a meeting 
between hi~elf and MOllet at Amas, just after the 
liberation, and sai~ wbat a very fine man MOllet was. 
MOllet later remarked that there bad, in fact, never 
been such a meetina! But this:flaaaaot story was also 
part of de Gaulle's technique. 
llis tongue in cheek was for these political critics 
of his that were afraid he was going to curb human freedoms. 
1 Ibid., p. 110. 
2.1!!1\· 
3Ibid. 
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-With an air of superb disdain he said: "It was I who re• 
established these public freedoms. Do you believe that at 
sixty•seven I shall start a dictator's career?"l 
The conclusion of the press conference in itself is 
a master stroke. Be spoke of France's high birth rate and 
I its great economic possibilities, as well as those of the 
newly discovered sources in the Sahara; and again he went 
into his symbolism of a great aad prosperous France, with a 
strong government. If he were to be called to power, the 
job would not be an easy one. and he would need the help of 
all french men and women to do it. And his coup de grace 
was: ••t 've said what I bad to aay. Bow I shall return to 
my villaae and shall r..ain there at the country's 
d.1sposa1."2 
What was the result of such a press conference? The 
general reaction w•• that it was hard to see how a de Gaulle 
aovernment could be avoided, for de Gaulle, cspitalizing on 
his charisma, had spoken with terrifying self-confidence. 
The press reaction was not unsimilar. The conference 
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hastened to convert many of the more cautious papers. lven 
thoup lip-service waa payed to the "republican leaality," 
papers like L'Aprort, C9Mat, and L! l'i&oro left little doubt 
that they were soia& to &i ve de Gaulle their backin& whole• 
heartedly, from now oa.l 
The beat description of de Gaulle's influence oa the 
key socialists was aivea by Pierre Courtade of L'I!!IPite, 
of the leftist press. 
It'll be difficult to keep him out, especially if the 
Socialists--or raoat of tbea-•eat out of his hand; and it' 
beaiaaina to look like it. le's playiaa a devilishly 
clever lf88• and most people prefer aot to look too 
closely. . 
A&ain one doubts that if it were not for his 
lcbariama that de Gaulle would have had such a favorable 
1 rUction. 
Re Ctglle &9 lyll §wins 
Fro. the moment de Gaulle uttered his first word, to 
the moment he was invested, one can well say is a classic 
lstudy of charismatic P.R. Let's follow the events. 
I De Gaulle's c~tic ....... ia.ued to the prose on 
1 1\lid.' p. 112. 
2 lW·. p. 111. 
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May 15 was tellina notbin& more than what he bad already 
been aayin& at Coloabey for tbe last ten years: That be 
was reacly to assume tbe powers of the republic. 011 the 
l.taais of this aessqe, tbe "Gaulliata" in Al&iers started 
their campaian of linking the insurrection to de Gaulle. 
llopelessly cliti rflialio, Mollet, lleoclea•lraoce and otbera 
try to get de Gaulle to condemn the insurrectionists, but 
he would not do it. le would not destroy the only element 
that would brio& bia hack to power. Ria rationale was simple 
Be had no power to 4o it with. As a simple citizen it was 
bia ciuty not to intervene ia the aovernmeat • a work. Orlly 
when inveatacl with power would he do it. 
This is why his charisu threw tbe balance to his 
favour. 
The iosurrectiooiata ia Alaeria started the putsch, 
becase they "felt stabbed in tbe back" by Paris 
politicians. The luropeaas ud Army ia Alatera felt 
feet. 
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It seems that on the nipt of May 13 de Chevipe, 
Minister of Defense, and a fo%'1Der ''colonialist" diehard, 
,whoa ube Lefts laraely held responsible for the Madaaaacar 
I massacres in 1947, thoupt that "aettin& toup" could have 
I I achieved rell\llta, ao loa& aa ole Calle hacln 't apoken, ud ao 
1Jlona as Salao hacln 't cried "Vive de Gaulle" in tbe :rorwa of 
Alaiers on the mornin& of Hay 1S. 1 
1 But from the moaeat de Gaulle was brought in the 
'\picture the whole "insurrectionist attitude" assumed a 
I 
' 
different character • • • an air of ,.respectability" as it 
were. :ror the ima&e was now created that de Gaulle would end 
I 
the war in Alaeria. 
I 
'\ Dlus when on the lSth cle Gaulle came out with his 
l'cryptie messaae his charisma was put into action. lis wait• 
ao4-see attitude, so unorthodox in any political r.a. work 
known in the west, was to be bia only weapon. ror what this 
I 
!attitude did was to cryatalize aides, and yet give each 
II 
jj•ide the notion tbat he, de Gaulle, was their man. 
11 'Ehia attitude wae reiaferced at hia preae 
1 conference. Re would not take sides, and yet he was 
I 
positive he could solve the crisis. 
1 Ib&d., p. 75. ,.., 
~==~=================================== 
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He was promising peaoe ia Algeria--a peace baaed 
neither on miUtary victory, nor eo aurreoder, but one 
based on reconciliation! It sounded good--perbaps.too 
&odd. 
I ~ 
} De Gaulle then approved. the attitude of the ~y-• 
which had prevented Alaeria fr.- fallin& into a state of 
chac~, and which. was. sharin& the Algerian population' a 
desire to see Paris "capable of aasumiaa its 
responsibilities .. " 
While uoderstandin& and appreciatin& the attitude of 
the military COUIIlaOd, de Gaulle then. s.aid that he wished 
the Array to remain "coherent and united"••at a time when 
tbere was no other coherent ad united force in the 
country. 
He thea warned the Government aaainst cutting 
cOJmBUnicatioaa betweu France and Alaeria. And he added: 
"Aa for tbe Army, it is the instrument of the State; 
but what we need 1! a State •••• And there's no ttme 
to lose."l 
When he was asked why he did aot bother answering certain 
questions Mollet bad put to bim, his attitude was perfectly 
charismatic. 
• • • My answer is: if de Gaulle is &iven exceptional 
powers for an exceptioaal taak, at an exceptional moment 
thea, surely • • • he will also have to be ai vea these 
powers by an exceptional procedure. ro2 an iaveati ture 
by the .. tiooal Aaaeably, for instance. 
Tb.e atqe was aow set for actioo. On the one hand 
tbe AJ:m.y io Al&iers encourqecl 'by de Gaulle • s press 
conference, weat oo with plana of "Algeria savina rraace" 
throu&h iovaaioa if necessary. On the other hand, the left 
1 lb&•· .. p. 109. 
2Ibid. 
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clearly opposing de Gaulle • s , .. fascist tendencies • ., While in 
the middle of the public hardly doubted the fact that de 
Gaulle's return was only a factor of time. 
In this turbulence the legal power of the political 
11 community in Prance wae falteriaa. As .Jacque• rauret said 
I lin the Monde: 
1 There is no such thin& as "power" any DIOre, there 
are only "powera. •• Political power, moral power and 
military power are no loaaer to be found in the same 
bands Or iD the s•e place. Power has been dispersed. 
De Gaulle is at Colombey, the Government is in Paris, 
and the Any is in Algeria.l 
Bence under such circumatances it was only logical 
f" for de Gaulle to wait and see, while others did the action. 
The opportunity came with the Corsican putsch. Tbe 
insurrectionists seeina that notbina was dooe about recalling 
Jl de Gaulle deciclecl to aet. Colonel Lacheroy, spokes1UD of 
liceaeral lalu. bacl alreacly ...S. tbe atat-t that "It 1a 
l1posaible tbet we -Y have to balp our friends io Fraoce if 
1· tbare 1a ao rapid da C81llle solatioo." 
By Saturday, May 24, aothiag bacl happened. It was 
six days since de Gaulle bad had his press conference aad 
no ccmtac:t seemed. to have been made with de Gaulle. On the 
l Jbid.' p. 121. 
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contrary. the Assembly voted the renewal of the emergency 
1
power for Algeria. by 473 votes to 93, the communists votin& 
for the Government. Pflimlin meanwhile was assuming the 
j Assembly that the Army leaders in Algeria were "defending 
national unity and republican legality." 
On that Saturday the insurrectionists took action. 
By evenins news from Corsica started pouring into Paris, 
that the islands--a department of Metropolitan Prance--was 
now in the hands of the Al&iers insurrectionists. 
Here with fantastic speed starts the great comic• 
dramatic denouement of events, that finally ended by de 
Gaulle's investiture. It was comic because all knew what 
I the outcome woulcl be; dramatic, because all were acting as 
if they laaew nothing. for while the &reat scare of 
, invasion started (the slo&aos ia Al&iers now were *'Get the 
I paratroopers to Paria"··thua conquerio& Part. from the air), 
1 the Parisians themselves were completely cold to the 
I situation. 
1
1 But let it be said at ooce••ancl this is extremely 
I 
sianificant•-tbat, to the vast majority of people in 
Paris, the thins that mattered JllOSt waa-·the Whitsun 
1 week•end. &ipt hunclred thousand people were reckoned 
to have left the capital. partly by train, but mostly by 
car, between the rriday nisht aod the Sunday momina. 
It was hot and swuay 011 that Whit-Sunday. The radio, 
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of course, had taken a very &rave view of the Corsica 
putsch; lfltmlin ba4 given a stern aad blood•curdlin& 
broadcast on Corsica in his beat disciplinarian manner; 
aacl yet, on that Wbit•Sunday Paris looked aa if nothin& 
bact happened at all. It was just a major beliday, and 
that waa all. I spent moat of the afternoon at the lois 
de Vincennes, which, unlike the lois cle loulope, is 
essentially ''workina class. " llere were the usual 
thousands of workiaa•claaa families sittin& on the graaa 
with their litres of rouse and their sausage and pate 
aaadwicbaa. There were tbousuda of others that day at 
tbe Vincenaea zoo. I particularly remember the scene 
when a •nkey snatched a amall at-;1' • handbq, after whic ~ 
the attendaDt bad to eli~ ever the barrier and chase the 
monkey up the artificial rocks; tbe people roared with 
lau&hter as he finally caupt the monkey and took the 
baa away from 1 t, ucl thea thumbed hi a noaa at the 
disconcerted animal. Tbeae people Gidll"'t look as though 
tbey were preparing to die on the barricades in a few 
daya. At tl\e Porte Do:n:e outside the Bois, the cafe 
terraces were packed by holiday crowds; nobody waa 
reading a paper. At tbe metro entrance a 10UDI man was 
diatributin& Communist leaflets calling for working-class 
unity in tbe face of tbe ra~ciat conspiracy of Algiera 
arad d.e Gaulle; aeat people 4icln 1 t even read thea, and 
just dropped them on tbe .. tro stair, littered with 
these yellow leaflets which, after being well trampled 
on, beaan to look like aut1a1 lMvea. • • • 
To couoter the invaaien, ancl arouse the people, 
\ Pflialin took to the radio, to appeal for constitutional 
I refonuJ while auuestina a levee en •••• if the invasion 
ever occurred. 
But the truth did not evade him. • had realized 
that very soon he would kava to cbooae between aenuine 
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lresistance-•toaetber witb the communists--or a deal with 
de Gaulle. lut it seems that by now the wbole thing started 
to wei&h b.i1ll down; ud future events show that he chose the 
·latter. 
The next bombshell explocled again at Colombey. On 
Tuesday, Hay 27, a statement •re pusslin& than the previous 
ones had been released by de Gaulle. 
I yesterday embarked on the regular process necessary 
for establishina a republican aovernment, which would 
be able to maintain the unity aod independence of the 
country. 
I trust this process will continue and that, by 
atayina cal.aa and d.ipifiecl, the ceuntry will show that 
it wishes this process to succeed. 
In theae conditions any action, wherever it may come 
from, which would disturb public order, risks to protluce 
the araveat consequences. While making allowances for 
circumatances, I cannot approve of any such action. 
I expect the laacl, sea and air forces to maintain 
the strictest discipline uader the command of their 
chiefs, General Salan, A.dmiral Auboyneau and General 
Joubaud. 1 express ay confidence to these chiefs and 
intend shortly to establish contact with them.l 
I A p~fect tactical .ova 1n a world of confU•ion. 
1 
Tbe Assembly was in ara uproar••what clicl the de Gaulle 
I statement mean1 With wbom had. be started "the regular mass"; 
how could thie be started without the knowledae of the 
Rational Assembly, and without tbe President of the 
1 Ibid., p. 141. 
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lapublic havin& called on de Gau~le to form the next 
Ooverament? Whereas PflimliD iosieted that he bad not met wft.b 
~· Gaulle, £trit•l£•••! published a sin&ular story • 
• • • It heel asked lflialio at noon whether be bad ••• 
de Gaulle; ad Pflimlin ha4 aaswerecl categorically: ,.no." 
All ni&ht, it said, reporters had, indeed, been racing 
J:CMmcl the various places where de Gaulle (who had 
v-.niab.ed fr• Colombey) an.t .fflilllin (who could be found 
neither at the •ational Aaaembly nor at the Hotel 
M.at.ipon) mi&ht possibly be. in cortferenea. Tbeir search 
had beaD in vain. De Gaulle wun 't ''recliscovaredu until 
be arrived back at Colombey at 4:45 a.m.l 
The reasons however are ••ita obvious. De Gaulle 
aeeina that power had cempletely disappeared from Paris, 
. ~·· . 
countin& on his charisma, projected biuelf once lllOre on the , 
-taae, hopina that this action -.ald be the last straw that 
"ould break the cael '• back. And so it was. ror the whole 
Iabate now ebanaed from an ethical one to a political one. 
tt was no looser a question of what was ri&bt or wrona·-but 
~t compromises should be deoe to save France. 
The day before••l!faaday, May 26•-be sent a raeesaae to 
•flimlia praposin& a meetiaa. Tbia was a~tted by the 
.. attar at tbe oiaht session of tile 27th. le expressecl bia 
~rati tude to cle Gaulle for hi a aeasqe 1 aod informed the 
lasembly that de Gaulle coulcl conaider takin& power only be 
78 
-~~==~=====l='b='=d=.·=='=·="=2=.==========================~======= 
I 
1 79 
le&al means. That be••de Gaulle••would be willin& to meet 
tbe political leaders wbo would like to examine with him 
the conditions in which a aove~nt un~er his leadership 
could be invested. Ia assured the Assembly that the 
Government was cletermined "not to create a power vacuum," 
and that it was to the Assembly only that be would return 
"the powers with which it bad entrusted him." 
This was it. Host of the people were already 
takina for granted that de Gaulle would soon be called in 
by Coty. Wlultever was bappenin& in the Assembly was just 
ataae play for tbe politicos. Tbe situation is very nicely 
des-cribed by Beuve•Hery io the newspaper L! Me.Dde: 
Tbe Pourth l.epublic, which did not live Hcently, 
baa not even manaaed to die nobly. And yet, the last 
meetings of the Assembly did not lack a certain di&nity. 
At the heacl of the Govermaeot there's a respectable man, 
wbo tried nobly to face adversity. In Parliament a 
majority seems resolved to support him to the bitter 
end to save our institutiooa and our freedoaa aaainst 
the insurrection. • • • Jut the country is in no 
adventurous spirit, and is aoin& peacefully about in 
daily business. • • • 'lba final upsurge is just another 
lie •••• 
Pflialin did not bave the courage to call the 
rebellion by ita real n... • • • or to show up the 
true causes of the Al&iers revolt••tbe plot that bad 
been hatched over a lona period; the natural 
exasperation of an araay left to 1 ta owa devices, and 
expected to perform all sorts of tasks, and held 
respooaible for all errors and all failures. • • • Ana 
then also the monumeatal indifference to it all by our 
~~==+=======-=~=-==========================~==== 
-people •••• 
It was too late to break these bad habits. Parliamen 
last niJht was no lonaer defendins legality, but merely 
ita •badow. • • • If Parli...,t and the Governaeat are 
unable to cope with the aedition whieb is spreadin& like 
mad, it would have been better to have admitted it 
openly. • • • There is only one real force today; and 
that ia the Army, wbich all kinds of troublemakers are 
trying to ••e for kbeir ewn ends. And there's only one 
real .. ral force left;1de G .. lle ••. de Gaulle ia today tbe lesser evil. . 
On WedQeaday, May 21, ColOllbey bad become the center 
l•f France's political activity. In the mornina a secret 
I 
eaaiasary from General Salan visited de Gaulle. In the 
aftemoon after a visit from Marshal Juin, cle Gaulle drove 
I 
I 
to Paris. 
However, it was at ni&bt that finally the long 
awaited question was answered. At 11:4.5 p.m. a COIIIDUnique 
was published by the Elysee aayina that President Coty had 
asked I.e Troquer and Honneville to establish contact with 
General de Gaulle, "with a view to examining with him the 
conditions in which he could constitute the Government of 
the lepublic." 
The mornin& paper Pl£1aiea L{bert described how 
Coty reached the conclusion of .ummonin& de Gaulle. 
1 Ibid., p. 1S4. 
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The three parliamentary leaders told the President 
that he would have to choose between a Government of 
Public Safety and tbe Popular Front. ''ror my own part," 
H. Coty said, "I absolutely reject this second alternativ41, 
which would plunge the country into civil war. I shall 
resian, rather than accept it. I shall now tell you that 
it is my fira intention to call on General de Gaulle. 
If any of you aeatlemen object, I shall address a meseaae 
to the lation to inform it)!f the situation t~t has been 
created ••• " Maturally .£tile paper continuedl the 
three political leaders C.01,tlcl not coad.t theyselves 
without consultina their respective parties. 
On Thursday, May 29, Coty sent a messqe to the 
Assembly. 
I a aaldna Geaeral cle Calle to be good enouall . to 
confer with the lead of the State and to examine with 
b.im the necessary steps t!Mt can iDDediately be taken, 
within the framework of republican leplity, to set up a 
Government of Rational Safety, and to bring about, 
within a sborj time, a fundamental reform of our 
institutions. 
In a way the game was up. The whole problem was now 
shifted frOID tbe shoulders of tbe pvernaent, and the 
president to that of the Assembly and cie Gaulle, and let 
them fisht it out. 
De Gaulle hurriedly picked up tbe cballenae and left 
for Paria to meet with Coty. ly ni&ht it was learned. that 
de Gaulle had accepted Coty's offer to form a sovernment. 
1 lbicl., p. 155. 
2 Ibid., p. 157. 
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The bi& question now waa would the Assembly arant 
I' 
1lde Gaulle his demands. After seein& the .President he issued 
\• statement in which he outlined the conditions on which 
he could fo~ a government: 
After its investiture by Parliament, the Government 
would require plenary powers for a limited period; the. 
ri&ht to make changes in the Constitution, such chanaes 
to be aubmitted to a referendu.; they would deal in 
particular with the "separation and equilibrium of 
powers", and with the relations between the french 
ltepublie and "the peoples with whom abe ia associated."1 
Getting the President to call on him was one victory of the 
battle; the second was to get the Assembly to accept his 
conditions. 
1 
Ria first move was just as erratic as all his 
~~tbers••be left it up to the President to start the initial 
fonver .. tioo with tlae "&roupa." 8e told Coty: "You had 
~etter also ask the communist leaders to come and see you--
1 lbtcl., p. 161. 
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-after all, they are rrencbm.en ••• "1 
Ria second move was a bolder one, He transfe~~ed 
bia office to Paris. By J'riclay, Nay l01 be set up his 
provisional headquarters at the Hotel Leperoure. His doers 
were opened to all tha~ would ceme to aee him. 
lle ar&ue4 with 'tile various politicians (sou of them, 
like H. Mitterrand, very hostile) in an easyaoina, often 
even jocular vein; many of thea left, fevlin& both 
puzzled and charmed by the man. 
In particular, he had &ivan &amadier and Mi tterrand 
the assurance that, just as in 1944, be was.ppposed to 
the exercise of any autonoiDOtls power, conflictin& with 
that of the central Govemmeat, by the liberation 
CoDBittees set up by the l.esiatance, so now he would 
take a similar stand with reaard to tbe Committees of 
Public Safety: 
.,As the bolder of the powers of the Jlepublic, I 
must, ipso facto, make everybody obey rue. I shall never 
be the man of any faction." (Jce ll9nde, June 1.) 
As regards Alaeria, he declared that it should be a 
federation, holi11ng a place in a Coafederation 
incorporatins both the Metropolis and the overseas 
territories (ibid.). 
This waa, clearly. in flat contradiction with the 
"integrationism" of Algiers. 
De Gaulle alao said that he would rapidly revoke the 
recent lmeraeoey Law • with its cenaotahip end other 
restrictions. 
That avenin&, be was already forming his Government.2 
Tbe point now debated waa whetber the socialists 
would back de Gaulle. Three daya before--on Kay 27th••tbey 
1Jbid., p. 155. 
2Jbid. J p. 164. 
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had passed a resolution refuain& to have anything to do 
with him. 
De Gaulle, aensina tnuble, acted iiiiiUKiiately. Be 
wanted MOllet and K. Deixonae••leader of the Socialist 
larli-.otary aroup••to aeet with hi• at Colombey, that very 
clay. 
After their retum to Paris oae could see that 
de Gaulle's chariaaa had once mere worked. 
This time MOllet was positively lyrical. 8e 
declared that his meetia& with cle Gaulle "had been oae 
of the areateat IBODlellts in his life," while Deixoooe, 
in a rapturous state, went on z:oepeatiag that cle Gaulle 
was 'tl vez:oy areat geotlemaa." Mollet added that de Gaulle 
was so fairmioclecl that "eveo the Couauoiats would vote 
for him, if they bad any seose."l 
Another timely coup that served in de Gaulle's favor 
to persuade the socialists was his correspondence with 
Vinceot Auriol••former presideat of tbe &apublic. Tbe 
socialists already shaken by MDllet'a aad Deixooae's ecstasy 
over de Gaulle on tl\8 27th, were aurprised to hear next day 
Auriol say that de Gaulle had absolutely no intention of 
becoming a dictator. ·~ iateada to maintain the lapublic 
and democracy." This he aathered. from the correspondence 
between de Gaulle and biuelf now m.ade public. 
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However, by Saturday the 31st, a larae number of 
Socialists were still undecided, and. Mollet agreed that in 
the investiture debate on the next clay everybody would. be 
free to vote wbiebever way be liked. 
lut by now the ice was bnken, and everybody was 
looking forward to Suoday when de Gaulle would present him• 
self to the Assembly. A little anecdote proves this point. 
Lots of other parallels were drawn durin& those days 
between the retain .. situation .. of J'uly 1940 and the 
de Gaulle "situation" now. It was related in all 
seriousness that on tbe Priclay a hesitant deputy had 
made inquiries at the latiooal Assembly as to how long 
after the vote for Pet-fn in July _1940 deputies continued 
to draw their salaries. -
Sunday, June 1, 111.1st have been quite a day for de Gaulle. 
1 At long last his day hacl come. llow more than ever he seemed 
I 
to have been destined. by provi4eace to save Prance. Tbe 
cboseo one of the aods was fiaally recoanized as the 
charismatic leader to achieve what others dared not even try. 
However, tbe first momenta before the Assembly must 
have been quite difficult. Por de Gaulle it BlUSt have been 
quite a concession to "lower" himaelf and personally ask the 
despised Assembly for its vote of confidence. 
1 Jbid., p. 165. 
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-• • • He thou&bt at first of simply sending the Aaaembly 
a messqe, on which it could then deliberate. The 
Socialists and MIP leac1ers tbou&ht the Aaaeably would 
take such an uoprececlente4 proceckare very badly, ancl that 
it aaiaht coat de Gaulle a areat number of votes. On the 
principle that Earis x•t .,,.9 WJ! MSSf, cle Gaulle 
aareed to read out a seven•minute statemeat, but
1
to let 
the subsequent debate take place io bis absence. 
After the preaitleat of the Aaaem'bly read out the 
names of de Gaulle's ainiatera, be walked up to tbe tribune, 
and delivered. his meaaa&•· lis stat .. nt••like all tbe 
others--was an .xample of simplicity. 
• • • A&ain he spoke of tile "deara4ation n of the State • 
the fact that the Array luu1 been "scandalized" by the 
lack of authority of previous GovernlleDta, and of the 
dauaer of "ctialocation and perb.ap1 even of civil war." 
"It is in these coqclitioas that I bave qreed once 
qain to lead the country, the State and the Republic 
alona the road of salvation. Ravin& been called upon by 
the Bead of the State, 1 am now aakin& the Bational 
A.saeably to iavest me for tbil heavy task." 
Be tbeo said tbat he wu askina the Assembly to grut 
hill plenary powers for a period of six months "to restore 
order in the State and restore hope in Al&eria. u lut 
such "temporary" solutioas .were obviously insufficient, 
and it would be ialportant for the Government to aet clown 
to the root of tbe trouble: an end must be put to the 
"confuaion of power" and to the "Belplessoeaa of the 
GoveraJII8nt ... 
"Subject to your approval, the Government I aball 
form will promptly submit to you a Bill reformin& 
Article 90 of tbe Coaetitation, so that the Katiooal 
Aaaembly may authorize the Government to elaborate tbe 
neceaaary chances in the Coaatitutioo, such changes to 
be sub.ttted to the people's referendum •••• the 
1 Ibid., p. 167. 
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Government will lay down the three principles which must 
be the very basis of the l.epublican regime: universal 
suffraae must be the source of all authority; executive 
power and leaialative power must be effectively 
separate, so that Governmeot and Parliament clearly 
assume ita attributions, each under its own responsibilit ; 
the Government shall be responsible to Parliament." 
The same constitutioaal reform, de Gaulle continued, 
would provide the "solemn occasion" for "organizing the 
relations between the french Republic and the peoples 
with whem she is associated." 'lbere was no time to lose; 
the necessary Bills to be submitted to Parliament must 
be quickly voted, after which Parli•ent would rise 
until the date markin& the opening of tbe ordinary 
(autumn) session. 
Invested by t.he confidence of the representatives of 
the people, the Governmeot could then proceed with ita 
urgent tasks which would preserve "the11ntegrity, the unity and the independence of France .• " 
The reaction•-understandably••was cool. Jut one 
thing was clear. De Gaulle was the person to save France. 
lis detachment, sophistication, and aloofness--which for 
years be was now preaching and practicing was what the 
country now needed most. To refuse de Gaulle the power 
would have been to refuse Praace her deatiny. 
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COIICLUSIOI 
Prom the 'ID.OIUmt be waa iovestecl to the time of 
refereachmt de Gaulle's r.L followed yery scb tbe usual 
·,patterns of governmental P.L, except for one thina. The 
I . . 
1 
product wbiah he triea to eel;l 1a not hi8 political 
.
1 
pbil.Hophy hut his charisma. 
I . Tbrou&hout bia c...,aip for bie referea .... ~t:hat 
j would have &1 ven bim his fifth Republic·-De Gaulle not once 
!I . i . 
1 hesitated to project bia imaae of charismatic leader for the 
vi'ctory of his referendum. rnm the very next day be was 
I voted io he put into actioo bis 110st cllarmina aad charismatic 
1 personality. , 
1 
• • • the Assembly bad the surprise of seeing appear 
before it a new and almost unsuspected kind of de Gaulle• 
not the a tiff, b.au&hty and "Louie XIV" kind of c:le Gaulle 
ij of the day before, but one who was now determined to 
1 carry out what a Cooaunist deputy, M. lriegel•Valri'IDOnt, 
was later te describe as "Operation Seduction." 
As Jd! IJRpde wrote: I 
Bo one bad expected tbat be would exercise such I 
skill, and sbow such gifts of diplomacy and psychological 
un4erstanding--with which even his best friends bad 
·•••r creclited him. SittiD& like a good boy on .the 
Governaeat bench (with H. Guy Mollet beside him and 
"' 
~====~================= 
looking like bia secretary) de Gaulle patiently listened 
to the rapporteur. Only after that did he way in the 
Dlf.ldest tone that either his Plenary Powers 1111 would 
be accepted, or he would ao. 
And as lA Mpng finally said, the assembly ended 
its last meeting so charmed by de Gaulle that it committed 
hara•kiri with a 81Bile on ita lips. 
By aow there is little doubt that de Gaulle's 
aystiq1.1e would not stand the teat of.real statesmanship. 
ror it is by a cruel irony of fate that "this strict 
cliacipl1nar1an has come as close as possible to establishina, 
if not a theory, at least a precedent of 'sacred 
~ disobedience •• nl 
To top it all, there is also the extraordinary trick 
of history which seemed to be in love with de Gaulle and 
realise all his predictions. In a way, there is a kind of 
miraculous "a posteriori" justification of every move he 
made, as if it were planned by some divine Providence, when 
to all others everytbin& seemed chaos and foolishness. And 
Ia• the rrencb explained it, he •st have been the chosen 
~lei of the aoda••for it is more than ~at planoin& and 
l~ein Gary, ·~e Mao Who Stayed Lonely to Save 
,ranee," Jd.fe Htaaliae, December 1.5, 1958. 
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self•detendnation. It is a great 114n who through his 
supernatural gifts becomes a leader and fulfills the 
aspirations of others at the riaht time and in the right 
place. 
Tus ended the charismatic phase of the nGaullist 
Revolution." 
I 
II 
I 
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